Westminster Shackled: State Building, State Weakness, and the Democracy Deficit in the Anglophone Caribbean

• Author: Clifford E. Griffin
• Pages: 140-172

Westminster Shackled: State Building,

State Weakness, and the Democracy

Deficit in the Anglophone Caribbean

Clifford E. Griffin

Introduction: The Democracy Paradox in the

Anglophone Caribbean

Anglophone Caribbean states, which began to develop amid a flurry

of post-the Second World War state building, constitute a subset of

the ‘third wave’ of countries that underwent transitions to democracy.1

Beginning in 1944, Britain began to provide these countries with

new government institutions and/or assistance in strengthening

existing ones in an effort to create the institutional foundations for

democratic political development. Such provisions were deemed

crucial because states with weak or non-functioning institutions

have become the source of many of the contemporary world’s most

worrisome problems.2 By the 1980s, their democratic credentials were

celebrated amid the euphoria of the two global reform movements

then underway. Popularly known as neoliberalism, and considered

as ‘…probably the most important political trend in the late twentieth

century’,3 these movements heralded the global trend toward a more

uniformly democratic system of governance and a more uniformly

market-based, financial, and economic system. Almost a generation

later, and with the euphoria having subsided, the apparent failure of

these countries to provide effective public safety programmes and

policies within the ambit of broader democratic norms4 continues to

raise persistent questions regarding citizen security, the strength of

these states, and especially the quality of their Westminster-derived

systems of governance.

These concerns are, indeed, justifiable. Table 9.1, which numerically

summarizes five governance indicators – government effectiveness:

66.05; control of corruption: 68.44; rule of law: 64.05; and political

stability and the absence of violence: 66.01 – indicate that on a scale

of 1 to 100, with 100 representing high levels of governance, these

countries are running a democracy deficit. While there are variations

from country to country, two things stand out: 1) citizen perceptions

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suggest a strong tendency toward exercising public power for private gain,

including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’

of the state by elites and private interests; and 2) much needs to be done

to reduce the level of corruption, enhance political stability, minimize

political violence, and to reduce perceptions of the likelihood that these

governments will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or

violent means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism.

These perceptions exist despite the fact that since the 1970s,

Anglophone countries have persisted with open contestation for political

office, which, almost without exception, have resulted in peaceful

transfers of power. At the same time, however, a pattern has emerged

in which electoral outcomes have resulted in a tendency towards one-

party dynasties that control Parliament; entrenched, powerful political

executives that perennially dominate political decision-making;

and creeping authoritarianism in the exercise of political power.5

Table 9.1: Average Annual Governance Indicators 1996–2013

Government

Effectiveness

Control of

Corruption

Rule of

Law

Political

Stability

Absence of

Violence

Voice and

Accountability

Antigua and

Barbuda 69.94 84.62 80.42 75.35 63.20

Bahamas 82.55 89.59 81.64 80.73 80.25

Barbados 86.23 89.28 83.56 86.14 89.81

Belize 47.7 52.14 47.42 53.75 69.82

Dominica 68.62 73.18 70.44 74.97 80.21

Grenada 63.71 72.92 59.82 66.57 70.35

Guyana 48.71 36.23 35.31 29.82 54.41

Jamaica 60.22 43.45 38.92 40.05 64.05

St Kitts and

Nevis 65.33 74.08 71.94 86.97 82.20

St Lucia 67.94 76.67 72.44 75.25 84.55

St Vincent and

Grenadines 67.98 74.22 74.06 77.65 81.33

Trinidad and

Tobago 63.62 54.85 52.64 44.92 64.47

Average 66.05 68.44 64.05 66.01 73.72

Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home

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142

These outcomes, therefore, warrant citizen concern given that democratic

institutions and processes should minimize the potential for the domination

of, or by, an individual, a group, or a particular interest regardless of

whether the nature of the domination is political, economic, or social.6

Further, and almost paralleling the neoliberal transformation, the 1980s

witnessed the emergence of citizen security as a major issue of concern

in light of the rising levels of crime and violence, especially homicides,

most of which are attributable to the emergence of the region as a major

transshipment point for illegal narcotics originating in South America and

destined to the streets of North American and European cities. Additionally,

issues of high unemployment, poverty, and income inequality have persisted

and have become even more pressing. These developments, therefore,

have raised the following probing, yet interrelated, questions: 1) What role,

if any, does the inherited governance model play in the apparent failure

of Anglophone Caribbean countries to strengthen and protect democratic

civic order and enhance citizen security by minimizing or eliminating

threats of crime and violence; and to reduce unemployment, poverty

and inequality? 2) Are these paradoxical outcomes of their democratic

experiment due necessarily to the inherited constitutional order and, if so,

will the various constitutional reform agendas being contemplated from

Barbados to Guyana to St Vincent and the Grenadines, and to Trinidad and

Tobago offer meaningful options for improving the quality of democracy

in these countries?

In attempting to answer these questions, the following contentions

are made. Contention number one posits that while the reforming of

constitutions may be necessary to improve the quality of governance, such

interventions will not be sufficient because of the nature of, and the relations

that govern the political economy of these countries, particularly the global

environment in which they must necessarily function. That is, changing

the procedures by which democratic politics operates may be necessary but

not sufficient to address, meaningfully, citizen security concerns, poverty,

and socioeconomic inequality. Beyond the internal institutional forms, it

becomes necessary to examine the substantive dimensions of democracy

by focusing on the structural relations – domestic and international – that

influence the process and outcome of politics. When viewed from this

perspective, what might at first appear to be a paradox of democracy may

be, instead, a paradox of globalization (internationalization), which, as Dani

Rodrik argues, has produced a ‘trilemma’ in which these countries are