Are Commonwealth Caribbean Parliaments Now the Least Dangerous Branch of Government?

• Author: Derek O'Brien
• Pages: 44-58

3 Are Commonwealth Caribbean

Parliaments Now the Least

Dangerous Branch of Government?

Derek O’Brien

Introduction

Criticisms of the performance of Commonwealth Caribbean

parliaments are legion.1 Most of these criticisms focus on the relationship

between the legislature and the executive and the dominance of the

former by the latter. This is attributable to a number of factors. Firstly,

the first-past-the-post electoral system, which is the electoral system

of choice across the region, with the exception of Guyana, has tended

to produce disproportionately large majorities for the winning party.

The post-independence era has thus witnessed a number of occasions

when the opposition parties in general elections have been effectively

annihilated in terms of seats in parliament, leaving the winning party

to govern virtually unopposed.2 Secondly, the comparatively small size

of the region’s parliaments and the absence of a cap on the number

of ministers who can be appointed by the prime minister mean

that Commonwealth Caribbean parliaments are dominated to an

extraordinary degree by members of the government.3 In turn, these

ministers are bound by the doctrine of collective responsibility, which

requires them to toe the government line in parliament. This has

made it virtually impossible for any government to be dismissed on

a vote of no confidence. Thirdly, while the inclusion of a nominated

element – either within a single legislature or in the Upper House in

those countries with bicameral legislatures – was intended to serve as

something of a bulwark against executive dominance, the fact that in

a number of countries the majority of senators are appointed and can

be removed on the recommendation of the prime minister has more

or less completely undermined this objective.4 Finally, their small size

has meant that the region’s parliaments have been unable to resource

the kind of network of departmentally related committees which, in

other countries, play such a crucial role in scrutinizing the executive.5

Though it is relevant to the discussion that follows, this chapter does

not dwell on executive dominance of Caribbean parliaments, but rather