Beyond Westminster in the Caribbean: A Perspective on the Regional Project

• Author: Patsy Lewis
• Pages: 59-75

4 Beyond Westminster in the

Caribbean: A Perspective on the

Regional Project

Patsy Lewis

Introduction

This chapter addresses the question of Westminster from the

perspective of the Caribbean regional project. Most of the writings on the

Westminster model in the Caribbean have focused on national politics.

Few make mention of the regional, and those that do, treat the region

as a solution for the problems of Westminster as they appear at the

national level. The question of how Westminster inhibits the regional

project is not well explored, although I have raised this as a concern in

my work.1 The further task of what a new regional democratic process

should look like and how the national project can be transcended to

achieve this remains unexplored. This chapter establishes a relationship

between certain features of Westminster as practised in the Caribbean,

namely the first-past-the-post basis for choosing the government and

the predominant role of the prime minister, and the effects of both

on the regional integration project. It also discusses ways in which

these may be overcome. It does not assume that there is no role for

Westminster constitutions, especially in preserving a national space

for decision-making and in safeguarding the democratic will of citizens

against an intrusive regional project. Nevertheless, its focus is limited

to ways in which Westminster inhibits the regional project.

Paul Sutton, in his discussion of Westminster in the Caribbean and

the failed attempts at constitutional reform, predicts that reform is

likely to occur in the context of a region-wide crisis which forces the

countries to consider a regional project, a federation along the lines of

the US model.2 Tennyson Joseph also suggests that the resolution of

deficiencies in national constitutions would occur at the regional level

in a federation:

In prescribing a new politics and a new democracy for our Caribbean

therefore, our first and most urgent task is to recognize that the first

independence revolution has run its course, and that the post-colonial

Caribbean state as we know it, has exhausted all its possibilities.

BEYOND WESTMINSTER

60

Once we come to that realisation, we will have no choice but to turn our

collective attention to the pursuit of the federal option (his emphasis).3

This tendency to view federation as the best option for resolving some

of the weaknesses inherent in the national sphere is not new. In the wake

of the collapse of the West Indian Federation and before the formalization

of post-independence constitutions for Barbados and the Windward

and Leeward islands, Arthur Lewis argued for a federal structure on the

following grounds:

…the maintenance of good government requires a federal structure. In a

small island of 50,000 or 100,000 people, dominated by a single political

party, it is very difficult to prevent political abuse. Everybody depends on

the government for something, however small, so most are reluctant to

offend it...The civil servants live in fear; the police avoid unpleasantness; the

trade unions are tied to the party; the newspaper depends on government

advertisements; and so on…The only safeguard against this is federation.

If the government in island C misbehaves, it will be criticized openly by

the citizens of island E. The federal government must be responsible for

law and order, and for redress of financial and other abuses….4

He concluded that:

They (political leaders) make federation a question of customs unions,

freedom of movement, exclusive lists, concurrent lists and the like. All

this is secondary. The fundamental reason for federating these islands

is that it is the only way that good government can be assured to their

peoples5 (capitalization removed).

Placing the burden of the democratic defects of national constitutions on

the regional project ignores the dynamic interface between national politics

and the regional integration project. I have laid the prime responsibility for

the Caribbean Community’s (CARICOM’s) implementation deficit6 at the

feet of national politics. Specifically, I identify two of the features of the

Westminster system that contribute to this: the first-past-the-post (winner

takes all) basis for electoral victory, and the excessive authority of the prime

minister.7

First-Past-the-Post

The negative effects of the first-past-the-post feature of Westminster

constitutions, which assigns victory to the party commanding the majority

of seats in Parliament, have been well recognized. Specifically, it amplifies

the victory of parties which may have small majorities or even minorities,