The 1989-1993 Administration

• Author: Trevor Munroe/Arnold Bertram
• Profession: Rhodes Scholar and Fulbright Fellow, political scientist, labour activist and politician, is Professor of Government and Politics at the University of the West Indies, Mona/Distinguished commentator on Jamaican Social History and Political Development is a former Legislator in both houses of the Jamaican Parliament and a former Minister of ...
• Pages: 544-589

544 / Post-Independence Administrations

The 1989 Elections: Background and Results

The PNP boycott of the 1983 elections left the JLP with a monopoly

of parliamentary power. While it had been a clever political

manoeuvre, it hardly made the JLP any more popular, and actually

created some sympathy for Manley from an electorate which shared his

views on the importance of electoral reform. The JLP therefore started

its second term with victory in a snap election, the holding of which was

opposed by 77 per cent of the electorate.

As early as the elections of 1980, there had been a considerable

reduction in party loyalty among voters. Polls done subsequently by

Carl Stone showed that ‘loyal party voting had drastically declined, from

87 per cent in the early 1970s to 48 per cent by 1986. On the other hand,

the level of voters who make choices on the basis of issues had grown

from 13 per cent in 1971 to 52 per cent in 1986.’1

The first challenge to the JLP’s claim of a superior economic

performance came in the form of the general strike of 1985. By then

with the manufacturing sector unable to compete against cheap imports,

the layoffs had begun in the factories. This was followed by even more

extensive layoffs of bauxite workers with the cut-back in alumina

production. In spite of massive external borrowing foreign exchange

supplies declined to precarious levels. Not even the Caribbean Basin

Initiative developed by US President Reagan seemed able to jump-start

the export-led economic recovery programme. The general strike lasted

The 1989–1993 Administration

Chapter 13

The 1989–1993 Administration / 545

for one week and once it petered out widespread dismissals followed,

and demoralization within the labour movement set in.

With the constant pressure from the PNP for fresh elections, the

first opportunity for the electorate to express their verdict on the JLP

came with the 1986 Local Government Elections. At this time, although

the economy was on a growth path with an upturn in investment and

production, the PNP scored a resounding victory in what many pundits

described as a mini general election.

In the second highest turnout in local government elections, some

66 per cent of the electorate turned out to hand the JLP a decisive defeat

in every parish excepting St. Thomas and Clarendon. In the aftermath

of the election, Seaga blamed the defeat on the inability of his

parliamentary colleagues to bring out JLP voters, insisting that it was

in no way a rejection of his policies. In direct contradiction to Mr Seaga’s

views, the Stone polls found that, ‘Hard times, disregard for the poor,

Mr. Seaga’s unpopularity, poor MP representation, unfulfilled promises,

declining social services, the desire for a change of government, and the

tax on savings are among the major reasons advanced by citizens for the

JLP defeat.’ 2

Despite the election setback JLP economic policies under Seaga

continued to produce robust growth right up to the elections of 1989.

With the launch of the Social Well-Being Programme in 1988, the JLP

confidently carried its message to the electorate — that the austerity

burden of the early years was now over, the adjustments to the economy

had been made successfully and the people could now look forward to

enjoying the fruits of their sacrifices. Despite the improvement in the

economy, ‘production levels in 1987 were still below real output in the

economy over all the years between 1970 and 1976’.3

The other factor that Seaga seemed to have underestimated was the

fallout with organized labour following the general strike of 1985 and,

even with the improvements of the economy, he never seemed to enjoy

the confidence and trust of the labour movement.

Just before the elections came Hurricane Gilbert, which brought

massive damage islandwide. Given the level of devastation, voters once

again saw the alliance between the United States and Seaga as their best

546 / Post-Independence Administrations

bet for handouts to assist their efforts at recovery. Substantial aid did

arrive, but, from the standpoint of Seaga and the JLP, it was not clear

whether the process of distribution was helpful to their election campaign.

On November 6, 1986, Manley wrote to Seaga proposing a bi-

partisan approach to crime and violence. This was followed by a second

letter in October of 1987, after which, extensive talks between both

parties led to the Peace Accord. This Accord, which came after extensive

discussions between both parties, was a sincere effort to prevent the

country ever experiencing the mayhem of 1980 again.

Cynics interpreted the success of the Peace Accord as being due to

the fact that the major purveyors of partisan political violence had by then

left politics for the more lucrative trade in drugs. They were now busy

claiming their share of the growing trade in cocaine between Columbia

and the United States, which used Jamaica as a transshipment port.

The trade in hard drugs provided the ‘dons’ with an independent

source of income amounting to millions of US dollars. This income was

used to finance the network of criminal terrorism, and to bribe officials

of the state, enabling the don to perform the roles of benefactor and

protector more effectively than the elected politician. This independent

source of finance altered forever the relationship between the don and

the politician. In the new relationship, the politician was becoming more

of a facilitator and a public relations consultant, as both exchanged

services as equals around the table.

The extent of the involvement of former political activists from

Jamaica in the drug trade was revealed in October 1987, when the US

Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms and Tobacco (BAFT) launched a nation-

wide series of raids on Jamaican ‘posses’ in North America, which were

then linked to 625 drug related murders.

The demise of the Workers’ Party of Jamaica (WPJ) before the

elections of 1989, and with it the decline of the Left movement in Jamaica,

needs to be more fully documented and studied. It was in the election of

1980 that the WPJ came face to face with the realities. Confident of a

PNP victory and the growth of more radical Left tendencies evident in

1976, they had expectations of progress and expansion. Hence Seaga’s

overwhelming victory shook their self-confidence. Their participation