The 1980-1983 Administration

• Author: Trevor Munroe/Arnold Bertram
• Profession: Rhodes Scholar and Fulbright Fellow, political scientist, labour activist and politician, is Professor of Government and Politics at the University of the West Indies, Mona/Distinguished commentator on Jamaican Social History and Political Development is a former Legislator in both houses of the Jamaican Parliament and a former Minister of ...
• Pages: 468-509

468 / Post-Independence Administrations

The 1980 Elections: Background and Results

Manley’s overwhelming victory in 1976 reflected the profound

changes that had taken place in the thinking and the living

standards of the Jamaican masses. They were a class on the rise, and

not even the declining economy, nor the anti-communism of the JLP,

could stop them from voting for the administration which had started

them on a path of progress. However, for the more perceptive, there was

the concern that the social base of support for the PNP in 1976 was

considerably different from the alliance of social classes and interests

which brought it to power in 1972.

In 1972, the PNP earned the majority of the vote among big

business, manual wage labour, white collar workers, and the

unemployed. By the 1976 elections, an overwhelming majority

of big business shifted to the JLP. White collar workers followed

with substantial swings to the JLP while manual wage labour

along with the unemployed shifted to the PNP in large numbers.

The overall effect was to polarize the class voting patterns

between socialist and non-socialist tendencies.1

Manley increased the presence of the Left in his administration by

including Duncan and Small in the Cabinet, while elevating Bertram to

Minister of State in the Office of the Prime Minister. Simultaneously,

The 1980–1983 Administration

Chapter 11

The 1980–1983 Administration / 469

several members of the radical intelligentsia were incorporated into the

regime as advisers and public officials.

The left of centre foreign policy of the PNP refelcted in the

establishment of economic and political relations with Cuba and the

Soviet bloc, had certainly raised the threshold of ideological tolerance in

the country. In this new environment, the Workers Liberation League

of 1974 became the Marxist–Leninist Workers Party of Jamaica (WPJ)

in 1978. Despite the Party’s small numerical strength, it had a real political

presence in the media, and significant influence in a whole range of

interest groups (including associations of teachers, doctors, women and

youth) as well as groups in some urban communities. The Workers Party

policy of critical support for the PNP administration made the PNP

increasingly vulnerable to charges of communism. As the economy

declined the people began associating their growing hardship with the

perceived communism of the PNP.

Before the election, the decline in the country’s economy had led the

government to initiate discussions with the International Monetary Fund

(IMF). During these discussions the IMF expressed the view ‘that

Jamaica should devalue its currency by 40 per cent and take various

other corrective measures, including sharp cutbacks in budget

expenditure’. 2

This decision was postponed until after the elections when, rather

than agree to the proposals of the IMF, the government began to develop

an economic alternative to a borrowing relationship with the IMF, based

in part on an emergency production plan. By February 1977, a viable

non-IMF path failed to materialize, forcing the government to sign a

three-year extended fund facility agreement with the IMF in April.

Inside the PNP, the ideological divisions became more pronounced,

and the consequent lack of unity had an adverse effect on the Party’s

capacity to govern effectively. The divisions within the Party predictably

overflowed into the wider community, and it was only a matter of time

before the vision of national unity was replaced by the doctrine of class

struggle. While ideology inspired a noble activism and even patriotism

among some Party and ‘Left’ activists, there is no doubt that it divided

the Party and the nation to the point where consensus became impossible

470 / Post-Independence Administrations

on any measure for national development.

In the run-up to the election, the fundamental problem continued to

be the performance of the economy. In 1980, Gross Domestic Product

(GDP) had declined by over 20 per cent since 1972, and was at its lowest

point in 25 years. Unemployment stood at 35 per cent as a result of the

decline in private sector employment, which had fallen from 57 per cent

to 34 per cent Those who retained some form of employment were either

public sector employees or part of the 46 per cent engaged in petty trading

and petty manufacturing.

Seaga had by then skillfully internationalized his opposition to

Manley and, with the help of Washington, developed a well-coordinated

strategy to oppose Manley’s increasingly radical posture. Seaga’s

mobilization of international anti-communist opinion gathered

momentum after Manley’s speech at the non-aligned conference held in

Cuba in September 1979, which was perceived as anti-US. Locally,

relations between the government and the private sector continued to

deteriorate with, particularly after the government’s acquisition of Radio

Jamaica and the march led by the Prime Minister in solidarity with the

Cuban Ambassador against the Daily Gleaner.

Seaga now stepped up the offensive, charging that under Manley,

Kingston had become

the subversion capital of the Caribbean, and that the PNP was

receiving Russian money through the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union (CPSU). [He] even went as far as to suggest that

the PNP … was discussing the possible need for a military

solution in collaboration with the Cubans.3

With over a year to go in the life of the administration, Manley

decided to call the election. The decision was rooted in his perception

that the political situation was no longer tenable.

It seemed to me that the Jamaican system was coming apart

under the pressure of events. Such was the case of hysteria,

tension, fear and bitterness in the society that I feared for our