The 1983-1989 Administration

• Author: Trevor Munroe/Arnold Bertram
• Profession: Rhodes Scholar and Fulbright Fellow, political scientist, labour activist and politician, is Professor of Government and Politics at the University of the West Indies, Mona/Distinguished commentator on Jamaican Social History and Political Development is a former Legislator in both houses of the Jamaican Parliament and a former Minister of ...
• Pages: 510-543

510 / Post-Independence Administrations

The 1983 Elections: Background and Results

In the 1980 elections, Seaga led the JLP to the most decisive electoral

victory since Universal Adult Suffrage. The two main factors

influencing the electorate were the PNP’s handling of the economy, and

the perception that the country was moving towards communism. When

one makes allowance for the number of middle-class and business sector

supporters of the JLP who had migrated before the elections, it is clear

that the dissatisfaction with the PNP was even more widespread than

the election results showed.

This election represented a critical departure from those previously

contested, in that only 52 per cent of the electorate regarded themselves

as being loyal supporters of the PNP or the JLP, while 27 per cent

regarded themselves as independent voters.1 Personal or class interest

rather than Party loyalty had become the deciding factor among an

increasing proportion of voters.

Seaga enjoyed immense prestige, nationally and internationally, in

the post-election period. Locally, he had made good on his promise of

deliverance, and 59 per cent of the popular vote had gone to the JLP.

This level of popular support climbed to 64 per cent by the time of the

Local Government Election of 1981 in which the JLP won a majority in

all parishes.

This was the period during which a mood of optimism swept the

country, created by inflows of capital, credit, loans and imported goods

The 1983–1989 Administration

Chapter 12

The 1983–1989 Administration / 511

following the return to the IMF by the government of Seaga. Gone were

the rigid controls on foreign exchange, as the new government made a

major effort to attract US investment, to which Washington responded

with the formation of the Rockefeller committee to coordinate

investments to Jamaica. By the end of 1981 US aid to Jamaica had

reached US$200 million, compared to US$20 million in 1980. President

Reagan confirmed the US endorsement of the new regime by inviting

Seaga to be the first foreign Head of Government to be received by him

in Washington.

Despite the euphoria of the anticommunist crusade, the Stone Poll

showed that 31 per cent of the JLP’s support was based on economic

hardship as opposed to 26 per cent on a fear of communism. This, along

with other findings in a post election poll, led Carl Stone to conclude

that

If the JLP fails to create substantially more jobs than any other

party in the past has ever attempted, its political ascendancy is

going to be very short-lived, and the ebb and flow of two-party

strength will see a resurgence of PNP mass support within five

years. The JLP support base is very fragile and contains many

former PNP voters who may switch back to the PNP on flimsy

grounds.2

The main challenge facing Seaga from the JLP was the prolonged

economic recession in the United States economy, which adversely

affected Jamaica’s capacity to earn foreign exchange or to attract foreign

investors. With the full support of the World Bank and the IMF, the

Seaga administration discarded import substitution and based its

economic recovery on export orientation and structural adjustment. With

the manufacturing sector unable to compete against cheap imports, the

layoffs began in the factories, followed by even more extensive layoffs

of bauxite workers with the cutback in alumina production. In spite of

massive external borrowing, foreign exchange supplies declined to

precarious levels. Not even the Caribbean Basin Initiative developed by

US President Reagan seemed able to jumpstart the export led economic

512 / Post-Independence Administrations

recovery programme.

By October 1982, according to the Stone Poll of that month, a

majority of Jamaicans had become dissatisfied with the JLP government.

Seaga had been elected to restore economic growth and prudent financial

management. After two years, the average voter was not experiencing

the improvements that Seaga claimed had taken place, and his

administration seemed well on the way to becoming the first one-term

government in Jamaica’s history.

What saved Seaga from this fate was the political impact of the

assassination of Grenada’s Prime Minister Maurice Bishop in 1983.

Bishop and the New Jewel Movement had come to power in Grenada

in 1979 in a coup which toppled the Right Wing, dictator Eric Gairy.

Bishop had visited Jamaica often and had quickly established close and

formal relations with the government of Michael Manley and the PNP.

The Stone Poll showed that 37 per cent of the Jamaican electorate

supported the recognition of Bishop, compared to 11 per cent, which

opposed; six per cent, did not express a view and the remaining 46 per

cent were unaware of the event.

What brought the political situation of Grenada to the attention of

Jamaican voters was the reports that it was communists within Bishop’s

own party who had killed him, thus reviving much of the anti-communist

sentiment and fear of communist subversion which had dominated the

1980 election campaign. The hostility of the United States to the

communist oriented Revolutionary Military Council, which had replaced

Bishop, helped to convince Jamaicans that Grenada, now constituted a

threat to peace and stability in the Caribbean. While 56 per cent of the

Jamaican electorate supported the US invasion of Grenada the PNP

openly expressed its disagreement with the US-led invasion.

A new Stone Poll saw a decline in PNP strength, based on the events

in Grenada. This was the opportunity of a lifetime for Seaga who was

about to announce a further devaluation of the Jamaican dollar against

the background of an 18 per cent cost-of-living increase. The government

had also now failed its second successive IMF test. Seaga, sensing the

opportunity to call a snap election, exploited the prevailing anti-

communist sentiment by first accusing the Soviet Embassy of being