The First Four Years

• Author: Anthony J. Payne
• Profession: Professor of Politics, University of Sheffield, UK. He is the author of several books on Caribbean politics and international relations
• Pages: 90-117

90 | The Political History of CARICOM

How did the integration movement develop during the first few

years of CARIFTA’s existence? It was not inevitable that it would survive

for very long, and credit must be given, first of all, for the fact that it

did so. CARIFTA nevertheless lived constantly in the same politically

charged atmosphere in which it had been born. Fragility was always its

most striking characteristic and disintegration an ever present possibility.

Problems, in fact, arose from the very outset. Jamaica’s belated accession

to the agreement had done nothing to bridge the gap which separated

it from the rest of the West Indies and, indeed, in the last few months

of 1968 disaffection with Jamaica probably grew. To the annoyance of

Eastern Caribbean opinion the Jamaican government showed no sign of

changing its mind on the question of its non-participation in the

Development Bank. On the contrary, it worked assiduously, if secretly,

to fashion a ‘Western Caribbean Bank’, with headquarters in Nassau,

comprising Jamaica, The Bahamas and British Honduras.1 The gulf was

further widened by the ‘Rodney incident’ in October 1968 when Walter

Rodney, a young Guyanese lecturer at UWI, was prevented from re-

entering Jamaica after he had attended a Black Writers’ Conference

overseas. Shearer publicly blamed the ensuing demonstrations and

violence at the Mona campus on the subversive activity of students and

staff, who were predominantly, he said, West Indians from the other

islands.2 Shortly afterwards Seaga spoke of the effect the non-Jamaicans

at Mona were having in ‘emasculating Jamaican nationalism’ and revealed

that the government had ‘given thought’ to the establishment of a

Jamaican university.3 The UWI was the longest-standing symbol of West

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The First Four Years

The First Four Years | 91

Indian integration, and this threat to its existence immediately set off

moves to call an emergency Summit of the region’s leaders to discuss

the future of the university and, at the same time, to try and reach some

modus vivendi on the Bank issue. Shearer did not formally object, but

he demonstrated his lack of concern for regional issues — and thus

added to the ire of his colleagues — by three times finding proposed

dates for the conference inconvenient.

When, finally, the Fifth Heads of Government Conference opened

in Trinidad in February 1969, the issue at stake was not just UWI, or

the Bank, but the future of Caribbean integration itself. The LDCs felt

that Jamaica was being allowed to dictate the pace and direction of the

integration movement in a way detrimental to their well-being, and

only postponed a planned meeting to review their position in CARIFTA

when, at last, dates for a full Summit conference were agreed. Their

intention to take a hard-headed look at their role in Caribbean

integration was not concealed for a moment. In the event, agreement

was reached with surprising ease. It was decided to establish the Bank at

the earliest possible date in 1969 and to proceed immediately with the

recruitment of staff. Jamaica’s ‘special problems’ were diplomatically

recognised and, having refrained from reopening the debate about the

Bank’s siting, the Jamaican government was allowed to reserve its final

decision on whether or not to take part till 31 May 1969.4 At the same

time the dispute over the future of UWI was allowed to dissipate of its

own accord. In the end, the Jamaican government had been represented

by neither Shearer nor Seaga, but by Lightbourne, whose conciliatory

manner and personal commitment to the concept of regional free trade

did much to clear the air. On his way to Trinidad he visited some of the

Leeward and Windward Islands and managed throughout the conference

to give the impression that, whatever the Jamaican government’s position

was on particular subjects, it was not rigidly and automatically opposed

to the interests of the Eastern Caribbean. For their part the LDCs were

pleased with the decision to expedite the establishment of the Bank

and, their irritation and impatience at least temporarily assuaged, they

expressed a willingness to continue as members of CARIFTA. In so far,

then, as it eased much of the tension in intra-regional relations and