The Establishment of CARIFTA

AuthorAnthony J. Payne
ProfessionProfessor of Politics, University of Sheffield, UK. He is the author of several books on Caribbean politics and international relations
Pages67-89
The Establishment of CARIFTA | 67
The only weakness which advocates of a laissez-faire strategy of
Caribbean economic integration were prepared to admit concerned the
manner of the distribution of the gains and losses to be derived from
integration. Already, by the mid-1960s, it was a recognised feature of
the doctrine that where an economic union is formed between countries
at different stages of development economically, and where market forces
are left to operate without restraint, the result is to increase the advantage
that the more developed states have over their poorer partners.1 Not
only do they already possess industries better capable of taking immediate
advantage of the enlarged market but, because they have various,
important ‘external economies’ (including such factors as a wide range
of public utility services, a skilled or semi-skilled labour force and the
presence of banks and finance houses), they also prove more attractive
to the location of new investment. In Myrdal’s terms, ‘backwash’ effects,
representing a self-reinforcing agglomeration of the gains in the more
developed territories, tend to prevail over ‘spread’ effects, by which the
benefits of the growth in the real income of the dynamic areas filter
through the union as a whole via an increase in demand for the products
of the less developed territories.2 As a result, ‘poles of growth’ develop,
which drain the development potential of the more backward countries
of the union, thereby creating, in turn, ‘poles of stagnation’. In the
normal course of trade diversion the less developed countries have to
suffer both the costs of paying higher prices for goods produced by
regional industries, which are rarely competitive in world market terms,
and the loss of customs revenue involved whenever goods are bought in
CHAPTER THREE
The Establishment of
CARIFTA
68 | The Political History of CARICOM
the tariff-free regional market rather than from extra-regional sources.
Far from receiving benefits from an increase in intra-regional trade, as
the more developed countries are likely to do, it seems that they are
more likely to retrogress in terms of industrialisation.
The problem of polarisation, therefore, is not simply one of unequal
growth, where benefits may be accuring to the union as a whole and to
each of the member units, albeit at an unequal rate, but rather the
possibility that, without effective compensatory measures, some members
will actually incur a net loss as a result of economic integration. Well
might Demas observe that it was the ‘fly in the ointment’ as far as the
market theory of integration was concerned.3 As he fully realised,
polarisation was the main obstacle to be overcome in the planning of a
free trade area or customs union in the West Indies. From the outset it
served to politicise the issue of comparative gains and losses from
integration and reduced the debate about regional economic integration
to the question of whether or not appropriate positive mechanisms
designed to make the concept acceptable to the poorer territories could
be negotiated between the various governments. The next phase of the
integration movement, during which attention turned to the practical
problem of implementing the broad strategy agreed upon by their
officials in Georgetown, has therefore to be explained more by reference
to the politics than the economics of integration. For in the period
following the Georgetown conference the central actors in the integration
drama were no longer the civil servants, the businessmen or the
academics, but the politicians themselves.
The task of forging an intergovernmental coalition which would
make economic integration politically viable began at the Fourth Heads
of Government conference, held in Bridgetown, Barbados, in October
1967, the first in the series to be attended by the leaders of all the
Commonwealth Caribbean territories. It was, in consequence, the largest
and most prestigious gathering of West Indian leaders since the days of
the Federation, and was taken with great seriousness by all the participant
governments. Their deliberations centred on three main themes. The
first was naturally the question of free trade. Barbados, according to
reports, still favoured the initial implementation of CARIFTA on a

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