Regional Security versus National Security
| Author | Hilton A. McDavid |
| Pages | 427-437 |
REGIONAL SECURITY VERSUS
NATIONAL SECURITY
Hilton A. McDavid
30
Introduction
The security environment in the Caribbean
has been altered over time by many factors,
among them developments in communications
and transportation technology, globalisation,
but more significantly in how politicians define
risk and threat (Zackrison and McDavid,
2008).1 High unemployment, marginalised
citizens, terrorism, organised crime and human
rights violations have been added to the list of
issues that the security forces must contend
with, which stresses budgets and resources.2
Since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, states
have been expected to operate within the
parameters of their national laws as the only
source of authority empowered to make
and enforce law, to include the fair and just
treatment of citizenry, the containment of
violent non-state actors, and stop illicit acts
which reduce law and order both domestically
and in the international arena.3
How to confront this new expectation
is increasingly critical for small developing
states and a transnational problem requires a
multilateral solution. Two good examples of
this can be found in the Caribbean itself, in
the cooperative venture organised to provide
security for the recent successful Summit of
the Americas, held in Trinidad and Tobago
from April 17–19, 2009. Caribbean military
and police forces from the remainder of
CARICOM countries were deployed to
the host country. This built upon the April-
May 2007 Cricket World Cup tournament
(CWC) During which nine host countries
joined forces to develop a Regional Security
Programme (RSP), bringing together forces
and institutions from ten regional states, three
regional organisations, and over seven extra-
regional states.
The International Cricket Council (ICC)
awarded the CWC 2007 to the West Indies
Cricket Board (WICB), which represented
teams from Antigua, Barbados, Grenada,
Guyana, Jamaica, St Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, St Vincent and Trinidad and Tobago.
The ICC and WICB agreed to a Master
Security Plan, which evolved into the Regional
Security Programme developed through
CARICOM; its overall cost topped US$13
million. A Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre
and an Implementation Agency for Crime
and Security (IMPACS) were established; a
Regional Law Enforcement Operation team
of 400 military and police personnel moved
among the venues, as needed.
The host countries, joined by Dominica,
established a “Single Domestic Space” to
last throughout the tournament, requiring a
CARICOM Special Visa, so fans could move
freely from venue to venue. Its cost – $100 –
and availability became problematic just before
the event began.
According to Zackrison and McDavid
(2008), strict security procedures imposed
difficulties on the fans, as did the monopoly
concessions for food, drink and merchandise,
reducing attendance and profits.4 One
newspaper5 characterized the event as “empty
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