The Politics of Deadlock in Trinidad and Tobago, 1995-2002

• Author: Selwyn Ryan
• Pages: 141-166

Selwyn Ryan 141141

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The Politics of Deadlock in Trinidad

and Tobago, 1995–2002

Introduction

This paper sets out to give an account of

and to analyse the political events and issues

that were the subject of acute political

controversy in Trinidad and Tobago in the

years 1995–2002. Four general elections

were required to break the electoral deadlock

that developed in the country as the twentieth

century came to its historic close. Evidence of

the impending deadlock existed as early as

1995 when the political Leader of the People’s

National Movement (PNM), Mr Patrick

Manning, indicated that he could not govern

the country effectively with a one-seat majority

in the House of Representatives, and sought

to resolve the issue by calling early elections.

The election however ended in a 17-17 tie in

Trinidad between the PNM and the United

National Congress (UNC), the former

opposition party.

Prior to 1995, the Afro-based PNM had

governed Trinidad and Tobago continuously

for 30 years: 1956–1986. The PNM’s

dominance was decisively broken in 1986

when a grand ‘rainbow coalition’ consisting

of the opposition United Labour Front (ULF),

the Organization For National Reconstruction

(ONR), and dissident PNM forces came

together with other groupings to form the

National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR).

The NAR coalition won 33 of the 36 seats in

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S E L W Y N R Y A N

University of the West Indies, St.

Augustine

parliament. The coalition was however

politically unstable and collapsed within months

of winning power as its various constituent

wings struggled to regain, retain, or maintain

political, social and economic power (Ryan

1989). Within months of being in office, the

Indo element of the party, which was

concentrated in the ULF, found itself once

more in opposition. In 1988, the dissident ULF

faction transformed itself into the United

National Congress, a name which symbolized

the party’s effort to alter its image from that

of an arm of the radical trade union

movement to one that could appeal to the

middle class in general and the Indian middle

class in particular, many of whom had hitherto

supported the PNM, the ONR, which had

appeared on the scene in 1981 (Ryan 1989a)

or the NAR in 1986.

The failure of the ‘rainbow coalition’ led to

the massive return to the PNM of those

elements which had deserted it in 1986. Also

many Indo-Trinidadians turned to the UNC,

which succeeded the ULF. The two major ethnic

groups had concluded that the type of coalition

movement represented by the NAR ideal

would not work in the foreseeable future, and

that the struggle for dominance would have

to be fought on a ‘winner take all’ basis.

The PNM won the first round in the elections

of 1991, winning 21 of the 36 seats to the

UNC’s 13. This victory was however only

The Politics of Deadlock in Trinidad and Tobago 1995–2002

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made possible because the NAR retained the

support of 24.43 per cent of the electorate

even though it could only win the two seats in

Tobago. In sum, the PNM won a 21-seat

victory largely because the election was a

three-party event and the NAR took votes that

might well have gone to the UNC. The UNC

claimed that the PNM won because of a

flawed voters’ list and slow voting in certain

polling divisions, a claim that had no

foundation. It also claimed that it lost the

election by a mere 7,000 votes in three closely

contested constituencies, and that had it had

a better understanding of the demography of

the constituencies and the organizational

capacity to mobilize its base, they could have

brought out the vote required to give them at

least 18 seats.

If the UNC’s claim was correct, as might

well have been the case, the deadlock would

have occurred a decade earlier than it actually

did. In any event, the UNC vowed that it would

not make the same tactical and organizational

errors as it had done in 1991, and that the

party would restructure itself to win the 1995

election, a goal which it was certain was within

its grasp. To do so, however, it needed money;

but above all, it needed to project itself as a

‘national’ as opposed to an Indian party based

in central and south Trinidad where the sugar,

rice and vegetable enclaves were to be found.

Between 1991 and 1995, the UNC would

sedulously seek to ‘break through’ the sugar-

cane curtain.

The UNC leadership was fully aware of

another reality viz., that the demographics of

the country were changing in its favour. The

publication of the results of the 1990 census

had revealed that Indians were the largest

single ethnic group: 40.6 per cent of the

population were classified as Indian compared

to 39.6 percent for Afro-Trinidadians, and 18

per cent for the mixed grouping. The party

leadership was convinced that population

growth and internal migration was serving to

undermine the iron grip which the PNM

enjoyed in the 1960s and which had allowed

it to win and retain power for 30 years. Several

seats that were hitherto ‘safe’ for the PNM

had now become competitive in that either

party could win them.

As Panday himself gleefully chortled:

That simple fact has put the PNM on

the horns of a dilemma from which it

seems unable to extricate itself. This

dilemma arises from the history of the

elite in the PNM, which has, for more

than 30 years, ridden the backs of the

African masses by appealing to race

in order to win the elections. That

strategy worked well for them as long

as the African electorate was in the

majority. Now that that is no longer

so, Manning realizes that he cannot

win the elections without substantial

Indian votes, votes which the PNM has

studiously alienated over the years in

a long history of discrimination,

vilification and humiliation. (Trinidad

Guardian, October 11, 1993)

Panday’s statement seemed to assume that

Indians were an undifferentiated lot, and that

all would support an Indian-dominated party

regardless of class or religion. Past voting

trends however indicated that this did not

occur. It also ignored the fact that a significant

proportion of the mixed population and the

minority elements, which together constituted

some 20 per cent of the population, were

more likely to throw their electoral weight

behind the PNM. Panday however expressed

regret that Indians had not yet come to

appreciate the power which the new

demographic reality conferred on them. As

he lamented:

When in 1945, Indo-Trinbagonians

celebrated the 100th anniversary of

Indian Arrival Day, Indians constituted

27 percent of the total population. They

accepted the fact that against a

background of racial voting, they could

not and would not participate in any

meaningful way in the governance of

the country. Today, Indians constitute

the largest single ethnic group in the