CARICOM Integration: The Need for Institutional Transformation

• Author: P. I. Gomes
• Pages: 44-59

CARICOM INTEGRATION: THE NEED

FOR INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION

P. I. Gomes

“If regional integration was hitherto an

option, it is now an absolute imperative”

(P. J. Patterson, 2003)

Introduction

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM)

is sometimes seen as a strange paradox.

This is because CARICOM, an integration

movement among f‌ifteen Member States,

is perceived as a dubious mixture of elegant

declarations, but with only nebulous benef‌its

and limited practical gains. Particularly

noticeable is the proliferation of organisations,

institutions and more recently “mechanisms”

that are unfortunately accompanied by a

paralysis of policy implementation. The

CARICOM Single Market and Economy

(CSME) is a special case that comports with

this observation.

From even a cursory glance of the

historical pronouncements and activities in the

integration process one remains uncertain as to

how to explain the tardy state of near-stagnation

and, in some quarters, growing frustration

over declining interest for the realisation of

what started with such promise. This outcome

has raised much cause for concern when taken

in conjunction with the complex, institutional

superstructure required by the recently signed

CARIFORUM-European Union Economic

Partnership Agreement (CF EU EPA).

To raise the prof‌ile on these and other

issues, the purpose of this paper is to stimulate

a debate in the interest of exploring options

by which an alternative and people-based

integration process can be envisaged. More

specif‌ically, it is argued that unless there is

institutional transformation, the intended gains

from regional integration will not be realised.

These and other issues are explored in this

paper, with a view to enhancing governance,

implementation and accountability. The next

section of the paper begins with brief historical

highlights of CARICOM Integration,

accompanied by related initiatives in the

African, Caribbean and Pacif‌ic (ACP) Group,

the African Union and Union of European

Communities. Section 3 examines the debate

on the intergovernmental mode of governance

and sovereignty, pointing to the search for

practical applications of supranationality

in the Caribbean integration process. The

need for effective institutional structures

to address constraints of the CARICOM/

CARIFORUM “construct” is outlined in

Section 4. Section 5 engages in a critique of the

institutional arrangements prescribed by the

CARIFORUM-European Union Economic

Partnership Agreement (CF EU EPA) and

examines their implications for CARICOM

Member States. The demands for institutional

innovation to fulf‌ill the EPA treaty obligations

and advance regional integration are described

in Section 6. In the concluding section, African

and European experiences are emphasised,

with lessons being discussed from the exercise

of delegated and devolved authority in EU’s

mode of supranationality.

5

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CARICOM Integration: The Need for Institutional Transformation 45

CARICOM Integration–Some

Highlights

The formation, in 1965, of the Caribbean

Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) is acknowledged

by scholars as an admirable achievement in

regional integration. Just eight years later

came the Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973

and the establishment of the CARICOM

Headquarters in Georgetown, with an

Administrative Secretariat as the “nerve

centre” for coordination, technical advice,

and consensus building, but with policy-

making and decisions being the sole preserve

and responsibility of the Conference of Heads

of Government (CHG). The Treaty and

Secretariat were a logical progression from

CARIFTA and had an almost parallel process

as that of the 10-year old Organisation of

African Unity (OAU).

The main work programme of CARICOM

primarily focused on three areas, namely, trade

and economic integration; foreign policy

harmonization, with specif‌ic attention to

negotiations and the trade-off in candidatures

for international and regional posts; and

functional cooperation.1 Decisions on what

would be undertaken evolved through the seat

of power in the CHG, normally a two-day

event containing an extensive agenda, much of

which was addressed in “caucus” sessions.

The guiding principle for decision-making

is to arrive at a consensus, with the ultimate

objective being unanimity. With consensus

achieved, the public is informed of the

decisions by way of elegant statements, or “best

endeavour pronouncements’ usually presented

by political leaders, who in the name “national

sovereignty” may choose what, when and how

to implement Conference Decisions. In this

environment, it is therefore not uncommon

to obser ve only partial implementation of

unanimous decisions, due to factors related

to limited human and f‌inancial resources,

impending elections and the underlying

absence of a larger political vision to drive the

process.

The outcome of this approach has

been called “cherry-picking” of decisions

for implementation, revealing the duality

of “consensus” on one hand and “inaction

or piece-meal action” on the other. This is

apparent in CHG decisions or more recently in

regard to Treaty Obligations, as in the case of

the Free Movement Provision for CARICOM

nationals within Member States, as provided

for in the Revised Treaty of Chaguramas.

Its selective observance demonstrates the

persistent and fundamental legal void of

CARICOM’s intergovernmental structure, as

there is no enforcement mechanism. This gives

rise, in large measure, to the paralysis of “law

enforcement” as distinct from the process and

function of “law creation”.2

While it can be said that “unanimity

and consensus” have helped to maintain the

continuity of the regional integration process

and contributed to its achievements of 36

years, it is, paradoxically, the “downside” of

CARICOM as “non-implementation” of

decisions simultaneously by all members

is the obvious outcome that CARICOM

citizens observe. Fundamentally, as will be

elaborated subsequently, the paradox lies in

the intergovernmental mode of governance

subscribed to as the present legal basis that does

not entail legally binding decisions of Organs

of the Community on its Member States.

In the context of regional integration

movements in developing countries, the

CARICOM process benef‌itted from the

formation of the African, Caribbean and

Pacif‌ic (ACP) Group of States, as evident in

the Georgetown Agreement that marked

its founding Treaty in 1975. Preceding that

event was the Treaty of Accession of the

United Kingdom to the European Economic

Communities (EEC) that comprised at that

time, only nine Member States. Accompanying

the UK’s Accession was the option for twenty

of Britain’s former colonies from Africa, the

Caribbean and Pacif‌ic, now independent, to