Understanding Democracy, and how to Recognise it

• Author: Kirk Meighoo/Peter Jamadar
• Profession: Member of the Democratic National Assembly and the author of Politics in a Half-Made Society: Trinidad and Tobago 1925?2002/Judge of the Supreme Court of Trinidad and Tobago and the author of The Mechanics of Democracy
• Pages: 1-34

Understanding Democracy, and How to Recognise it |1

Understanding Democracy,

and How to Recognise it

The word ‘democracy’ too often has been used to justify actions

which seriously contradict the democratic ideal. We wish to help restore

a real, practical meaning – and value – to the word and the concept of

‘democracy’ because it is important to us in Trinidad and Tobago. Around

the world, ‘democracy’ is regularly used to legitimate unpopular and

repressive authority, used interchangeably with the ‘will of the people’

(embodied in the government or ruling party), ‘rule of law’, ‘majority

rule’, ‘advancement of freedom’, or ‘end of tyranny’. Indeed, ‘democracy’

is so abused on all sides of the political prism that it seems to have little

real meaning any longer. Unfortunately, the misuse of the word

‘democracy’ occurs not only for dishonourable reasons. It occurs also

because of genuine misunderstanding and confusion by well-meaning

people who have acquired simple, formulaic, but commonly expressed,

understandings of democracy. The lack of clarity on what democracy

precisely is, allows other less laudable – and occasionally sinister – goals

to be advanced, sometimes unintentionally.

Misunderstanding the essential meaning of ‘democracy’ becomes

particularly significant when governments, political parties, and the

general public are considering constitution reform, as so many in the

Caribbean are presently doing. Platitudes, hostile attitudes, and simply

incorrect statements abound, and a clarification of the basic notion of

the principles of democracy is critically needed in order to ground and

make more fruitful the debate in Trinidad and Tobago – and perhaps

throughout the region, if not beyond. In contemporary Trinidad and

Tobago, topics like democracy, and parliamentary and electoral reform

can quickly provoke partisanship and irrational passion. We wish to

avoid such distraction in this book. Accordingly, we attempt to actively

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2 | Democracy and Constitution Reform

take into consideration as wide a cross section of legitimate interests as

possible – from defenders of the status quo to the many critics of it – in

order to speak to the widest interested audience possible. Indeed, it

seems to us that too many calls for constitutional reform are based

primarily upon the resentful (even if sometimes justifiable) sentiment

that ‘the prime minister has too much power’. Given this orientation,

any prime minister could legitimately reject any resulting proposals as

merely politically motivated attempts to defeat a governing party by

other than the existing rules in existing institutions. Aside from this

very practical consideration, there is also the extremely important

theoretical and philosophical question of how much power is too much.

And, to be fair, can it be possible that a prime minister might have too

little power? Weak authority is dangerous in a country, and virtually

guaranteed not to win popular legitimacy for any system of government.

Ineffective government can never be desirable. How do we decide on

the appropriate amount of prime ministerial, or central, power? Is it

ultimately a matter of opinion, political interest, will, and relative power?

Is it possible to make such a judgement from a position not aligned to

current political interests and parties?

We attempt to answer these questions in two steps. First, we try to

arrive at an historically sustainable understanding of what constitutes

the heart of democratic self-government. Secondly, we seek to come to

terms with the messy real-world process of advancing democratic

development in specific times, places, and circumstances, among real

people with specific and peculiar cultures, traditions, rivalries, cleavages,

worldviews, economies, social relations, and histories. What emerges is

a complex relationship in which universal ideals are peculiarly expressed

through particular peoples, changing through time, place, and

circumstance. Without such a nuanced and dynamic understanding,

we do not think it is possible to advance effective democratic reform for

real people.

For this reason, we question five widely accepted understandings of

what lies at the core of democratic self-government. We firstly argue

that the holding of regular, free, and fair elections – though important

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and, indeed, an important concern of this book – is not sufficient to

qualify a system of government as being fully democratic. It is possible,

for example, to elect administrations which might be unaccountable

enough during their terms of office to be reasonably labelled as autocracies

or even tyrannies. Merely having the opportunity to elect another

administration, perhaps equally domineering, at the end of a five-year

term surely does not capture the essence of what democracy means.

Secondly, neither universal adult suffrage – or more tellingly ‘one

man, one vote’ – defines democracy, although broad inclusion is

important for popular legitimacy. ‘One man, one vote’ demonstrates

that full citizenship is socially defined (in this case by sex). Today the

only barriers to voting in Trinidad and Tobago are age, residence, and

citizenship. In the future, these restrictions might be seen as backward,

in the same way as we now see earlier voting restrictions on women, 20

year-olds, or men without property. On the other hand, we might think

it irresponsible to give a 15 year-old, a non-citizen, or a non-resident

the right to vote, as earlier democrats believed that it was irresponsible

to give the right to vote to persons without property (a stake in the

land), a sufficient income to afford free time, or satisfactory education

and literacy. Additionally, sometimes, certain regions or groups in a

polity must be weighed qualitatively rather than quantitatively, as with

the case of Tobago and Trinidad. Indeed, the heart of democratic self-

government is at base something qualitative rather than quantitative.

Thirdly, the r ule of law – again, though important – cannot be

equated with democracy. Certainly, the rule of law is necessary, but it is

not sufficient. It is quite possible, for example, that the law may legitimate

slavery and other forms of forcible servitude, or deny free speech, free

political association, or free assembly, or ban all political parties but the

ruling one. How can such rule of law meaningfully be described as

democracy? Unfortunately, the rule of law does not always include

adherence to the principles of natural justice and fundamental fairness.

(These principles include the requirement that all parties be given a fair

hearing in any dispute, and that all evidence to be made available to all

parties involved the dispute for verification, scrutiny, and rebuttal. It