Third Parties and Crisis Settlement Between Neighbours: India and Pakistan Pre and Post-Nuclearization

• Author: Tinaz Pavri
• Pages: 308-326

Third Parties and Crisis Settlement Between Neighbours

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Third Parties and Crisis Settlement Between

Neighbours:

India and Pakistan Pre and Post-Nuclearization

T I N A Z P A V R I

Spelman College

20

Introduction

Why have some crises between India and

Pakistan over the past few decades been

amicably settled,1 while others have ended in

wars that have exacted devastating human and

resource tolls?2 Indeed, in a larger context,

why does de-escalation and settlement

succeed in some cases of crises but not in

others? In seeking answers to these questions

of daunting complexity, authors have focused

on variables ranging from arms and weapons

balances and resource distributions to the

micro-mechanics of decision making on the

part of leaders. This article examines

interactions between the two parties during

times of crisis and the roles that third parties

have played in them. It also seeks to address

whether these answers hold true for India and

Pakistan in the wake of their recently-declared

nuclear status. In other words, does what we

know about interactions between the two

countries during crises and the role of third

parties therein remain consistent for cases in

the post-nuclear period?

Previous research on the subject of third

parties3 in the Indo-Pakistani conflict indicates

that their particular characteristics, the roles

they assume and strategies they adopt are

crucial determinants of eventual outcomes in

times of crisis. It further indicates that this is

especially the case in protracted, ethno-

religious conflicts, where decades of hostility

between actors engaged in such situations

make it very difficult for conflicting actors to

themselves seek mutual settlements;4 it

becomes imperative, in such contexts, that

third parties take the initiative in bringing these

conflicting actors together with the final aim

of conflict settlement and resolution.

Third Parties in the context of

Formal and Informal Settings

A robust body of literature already exists

on the characteristics and strategies of third

parties in different conflictual situations.

However, much of that scholarship has

remained at a highly theoretical and

generalized level, and not enough attention

has been paid to the systematic analyses of

third-party intervention in the context of

substantive cases played out by ‘real-world’

actors who have well-defined personalities,

tumultuous ‘home’ constituencies and histories

of entrenched hostility and confrontation

between the states and peoples they represent.

On the other hand, case-studies that include

these variables (and there have been many

excellent country studies by scholars like

Zartman over the years)5 often focus on the

micro level of intervention strategy rather than

attempting a meeting of case-study and theory,

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or a fitting of cases into a larger pre-

negotiation and negotiation theory.

The traditional literature on bargaining and

formal negotiations (particularly in its

organizational and management

manifestations) has been largely theoretical,

experimental or acontextual and has not been

systematically applied to a wide range of

actual cases. It has often tended to assume

classical rationality on the part of actors

concerned, where decisions are made by

detached individuals who objectively calculated

the expected utility of available choices before

embarking on a course of action. In reality,

decision-makers have to contend with

unconscious motives and differing cognitive

capabilities as they make decisions.6 Further,

the rational school has focused heavily on

formal negotiation processes defined by

narrowly-delineated contexts, whereas in fact,

historical and cultural experiences have a

great impact on the possible success of

negotiations.7

Scholars like Kelman8 and Saunders,9

through their sustained involvement with

protracted conflicts the world over, acquired

the sense that theories of formal negotiations

were not helpful in understanding the

dynamics of such cases, where actors involved

nursed grievances in the face of which they

would often have trouble accepting the validity

of their opponents’ positions, the weight of their

problems and the legitimacy of their very

existence. They proposed problem-solving

workshops on non-official levels and meetings

on official levels to foster understanding and

facilitate settlements to conflicts. However,

many of the questions raised in this article —

what kind of third party, what type of strategies,

when and where to intervene, and how to get

parties to initially communicate when they are

reluctant to do so — remain largely

unanswered in their work.10

Pre-negotiations, as this theoretical body of

work has come to be recognized for its general

insight that a focus on formal negotiations is

simply not enough and that we need to look

prior to actual negotiations to what transpired

before, has its latest proponents in scholars

like Stein, et al., Rothman and others.11 Stein

et al. assume that at least one of the parties

engaged in pre-negotiations necessarily holds

a desire for cooperative agreement/

negotiation as its end goal and that at least

one of the parties frames the crisis facing them

in terms of a joint problem. The definition they

propose echoes this.12 Rothman also avers that

pre-negotiations include a preparation for

negotiations by ‘jointly framing’ issues of

conflict.

In the case of India and Pakistan, previous

research suggests that we cannot assume any

joint desire for settlement on the part of

conflicting actors. Rather, we need to focus

on how this joint desire might be fostered.

Evidence from cases of conflict settlement

points to the possibility of such a search for

mutual cooperation being spearheaded and

assisted by third parties; this process will be

elaborated upon.

I consider a number of third party variables

including specific characteristics and strategies

(as defined and operationalized below) in the

context of one protracted conflict over several

decades, that between India and Pakistan. In

doing so, I hope to contribute to the cumulation

of knowledge in the area of third parties,

generally, and their roles and strategies in the

early stages of protracted conflicts,

specifically.13 In addition, I hope to address a

void in the literature that has thus far failed to

look at third party roles in a nuclear context

and offer comparative insight on whether this

role is different from non-nuclear cases.

A total of six case studies are examined.

Five crises that arose between India and

Pakistan since their independence in 1947 up

until 1990 are compared in an effort to shed

light on the difference, if any, third parties

made on outcomes. These constitute the ‘pre-