The Jury on Trial

• Author: Ramesh Deosaran
• Pages: 475-496

475

THE JURY ON TRIAL

The Jury on

Trial1

Ramesh Deosaran

Twenty-One

INTRODUCTION

There is an outstanding need for social

science inquiry into specific social, legal and

political institutions of the Caribbean. While

it is useful to have a broad appreciation of

the social forces which affect group relations

in the wide society, it is important to have

some understanding of how the various

social groups in the society view and deal

with one another when placed in specific

institutions. This study draws upon

traditional sociological studies to examine

social relations within a specific legal

institution, the jury system.

It explores some aspects of the social

psychology of the jury trial in the multi-

racial post-colonial society of Trinidad.2It is

developed from a series of previous studies

by the author (Jury Research Project) on the

social composition of jurors and their

verdicts, the legal profession’s assessment of

trial by jury, and social bias in jury selection,

exemptions, and foreman selection.

These earlier studies laid a sociological

foundation for further work, especially with

regard to the psychological factors which

mediate between the social composition of

jurors and their courtroom behaviour. One

study showed racial, social class and sex

biases in the selection of 2,443 jurors for 390

trials (Deosaran 1981b). Foreman selection

also revealed a strong bias in favour of upper

social class, male, and non-Indian groups

respectively (Deosaran 1980). The legal

profession in Trinidad expressed strong

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CRIME, DELINQUENCY AND JUSTICE

dissatisfaction with the apparent reasons used by juries for their verdicts (Deosaran

1980).

The first of their kind in the Commonwealth Caribbean, these studies reflect

similar work done elsewhere on the social composition of juries (e.g. Baldwin

and McConville 1979, 1980, Cant 1974, Sealey and Cornish 1973, Van Dyke 1977),

the selection of jury foreman (Baldwin and McConville 1980), and juror

stereotyping (e.g. Boehm 1968, Broeder 1965, Efran 1974, Landy and Aronson

1969).

This line of research, however, wavers uncomfortably between two strong

mandates. On the one hand, through either common or statutory law, questioning

jurors on particular verdicts or making firsthand observations of jury room

deliberations is strictly forbidden. On the other hand, one of the pillars of

democracy and, more particularly, of scientific inquiry is accountability and the

obligation to ensure that human conduct is rational and fair. Whatever the worth

of jury privacy, the legal restriction on scientific inquiry has contributed to serious

gaps in the relevant research. Researchers have had to resort to mock trials,

simulated juries, jurors’ anecdotes, courtroom impressions from policemen and

other judicial officers, and a host of indirect techniques for measuring jury

behaviour (e.g. Adler 1973, Kaplan 1977, Nemeth and Sosis 1973, Simon 1959). A

number of reviews have pointed out the practical inadequacies of such indirect

techniques (Erlanger 1970, Gerbasi et al. 1977, Tapp 1980, Wrightsman 1978).

The major criticism is that the ‘reality’ of the trial is crucially missing from the

responses of non-jurors.

This study mixes direct observations with data provided by the jurors

themselves. The theoretical framework is the interactionist perspective. Given

the format of a jury trial, the distribution of rank and order, the allocation of

roles and status in the courtroom, the entire situation is a mixture of law, sociology

and psychology in action. The law structures the trial, sociology establishes some

distinctions on the basis of status and rank, and psychology provides the basis on

which impressions and influence also affect the trial outcome.

Trial by jury, when set in a courtroom, offers a firsthand example of the way

race, class and sex could express themselves in effective ways, given the range of

discretion possessed by the participants. For example, a jury, in deciding upon

the facts, is in a position to determine motives, credibility and demeanour. Such

variables depend upon the imagination of the jurors, the impressions they bring

into the courtroom. These impressions and stereotypes persist sometimes, in spite

of instructions from the presiding judge or the nature of the ‘hard evidence’

presented.

In fact, many trials are conducted on the basis of eyewitness testimony or

evidence which are subject to interpretation. The situation is further affected by

the fact of having an adversarial system of cross-examination wherein two sides

to the same matter are being offered though in varying degrees of strength.