The Havana Consensus: Cuba's ties with five CARICOM States

• Author: John Walton Cotman
• Pages: 200-217

THE HAVANA CONSENSUS:1

CUBA’S TIES WITH FIVE CARICOM STATES

John Walton Cotman

15

Converging Foreign Policy

Agendas

There has been regional and global policy

convergence between Cuba and its neighbours

Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica and

Trinidad and Tobago since late 1993. It

is codif‌ied in the CARICOM–Cuba Joint

Commission,2 Trade and Economic Agreement

between the Caribbean Community and the

Government of the Republic of Cuba,3 Partial

Scope Agreement between the Republic of Cuba

and the Caribbean Community under the

Montevideo Treaty of 1980,4 and the Protocol to

the Trade and Economic Agreement between the

Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the

Government of the Republic of Cuba.5

In December 2005, the Second Summit

of Heads of State and Government of the

Caribbean Community and the Republic of

Cuba met in Barbados. It issued the Declaration

of Bridgetown advocating: South-South regional

cooperation for sustainable human-centred

development, multilateralism and fair trade,

achieving UN Millennium Development Goals

by 2015, increased resource f‌lows to the global

South, defence of sovereignty and rejection of

conditionality in the provision of development

assistance, strengthening regional integration

and opposition to terrorism, illegal drug-

traff‌icking and Washington’s Cuba embargo. It

recognized the socialist isle “as an integral part

of our vibrant and diverse Caribbean Region,”

and praised “the invaluable role of technical

assistance extended by the Government of

Cuba…especially in education, training,

health care, sports and the cultural industries

which through the quality and cost of the

expertise rendered, has allowed CARICOM

Member States to improve their social capital

and at marginal cost.” The Summit unveiled

new areas of health collaboration: HIV/AIDS

prevention and treatment, chronic non-

communicable diseases, rehabilitation therapy,

medical technology, biotechnology, research

and enhanced nursing education.6 These

commitments were reaff‌irmed in December

2008 in the Declaration of Santiago de Cuba.7

Voting patterns in the United Nations

General Assembly provide another measure

of foreign policy convergence. The US

State Department tracks them. It closely

monitors “important” votes – those crucial

to Washington.8 In 2000, voting coincidence

with the US in the General Assembly on

“important” votes was 47.9%. For Cuba, it was

22.2%. Among the “CARICOM Five” there

was considerable variation. At 62.5% Trinidad

and Tobago’s voting coincidence was almost

three times Cuba’s and considerably above

the 47.9% average for the General Assembly.

Barbados and Grenada voted the same as the

US 50% of the time – still above the General

Assembly average, and over twice that of

Havana. Jamaica and Guyana – at 40% and

36.4%, respectively – could not be perceived

as allies in Washington based on this criterion

(table 15.1).

201

The Havana Consensus: Cuba’s ties with f‌ive CARICOM States 201

The 2008 data show a dramatic shift

in CARICOM foreign policy preferences.

For General Assembly members there was

a considerable drop in voting coincidence

with the US on impor tant votes. On average,

votes of General Assembly members had

fallen by 20.3 percentage points to 27.6%.

For Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica,

and Trinidad and Tobago in 2008, voting

coincidence on issues deemed important

contrasted starkly with Washington.

CARICOM states’ votes were 10%, 12.5%,

12.5%, 11.1% and 12.5%, respectively. Cuba’s

was 0%. The growing estrangement between

Washington and CARICOM on “important”

General Assembly votes from 2000 until 2008

was most dramatic for Trinidad and Tobago

– falling by 50 percentage points. Barbados

declined by 40. Grenada dropped by 37.5.

Jamaica fell by 28.9, and Guyana by 23.9.

There is an undeniable convergence in voting

patterns between Cuba and the f‌ive former

British colonies. Their foreign policy goals are

increasingly at odds with Washington’s (Table

15.1).

Views on political economy

Cuba’s policy choices are premised on

socialist property and social relations that have

been substantially transformed since 1989.

The Cuban Communist Party seeks “to perfect

socialism, not to move toward capitalism.”9

Havana continues its steadfast critique

of capitalism, particularly the neoliberal

consensus shaping the global community

since the 1980s. As Marxists, Cuban decision-

makers view “neoliberalism [as] a discredited

but not defeated doctrine.”10

State economic policy in CARICOM

emphasizes the private sector’s predominant

role.11 In the 1980s, under Washington’s

neoliberal consensus, the “Big Four” and

Grenada introduced policies “geared towards

limiting the role of the State in the economy and

reinvigorating stagnant production systems,

which were reoriented toward export markets.

Trade reforms were implemented and regional

integration gained new impetus.”12 The f‌ive

Anglophone states expect that cooperation and

integration within CARICOM will facilitate

key policy goals: (1) improve living standards

via poverty reduction, the promotion of

gender equality, advances in infant and

maternal health, and reversing the toll of HIV

and AIDS; (2) reach full employment; (3)

“accelerate understanding among the citizenry

and advance social, cultural and technological

development”; (4) expand cooperation in

transportation and telecommunications;

and (5) realize environmentally sustainable

development.13

The Heritage Foundation’s Index of

Economic Freedom is useful for comparing the

extent of implementation of neoliberalism.14

In 1996, Cuba was “Repressed”, with a score

of 28. The beginning of its economic recovery

did not conform to neoliberal doctrine.

Trinidad and Tobago was “Moderately Free”

with a score of 69.6. Jamaica (score 66.5) and

Barbados (score 60.4) were also “Moderately

Free.” Guyana was “Repressed”, with a score

of 49.5 (Table 15.2).

The 2009 Index of Economic Freedom

ranked Cuba third to last overall at 177, and

last in the Americas (29th). It was “Repressed”

with a score of 27.9, having lost 0.1 points

since 1996. Barbados made substantial progress

since 1996. Characterized as “Mostly Free”

(71.5), it had gained 11.1 points by 2009,

ranked 22nd overall and 2nd in the Americas.

Trinidad and Tobago was “Moderately Free.”

Its score was 68 with a global rank of 41, and

Americas rank of 7. Trinidad and Tobago’s

adherence to neoliberal doctrine fell 1.6 points

since 1996. Jamaica was still “Moderately Free”

at 65.2 points (9th in the Americas, 52nd in

the world). Kingston had made no progress

since 1996, losing 1.3 points. Guyana changed

from 49.5 in 1996 to 48.4 in 2009 – a loss of

1.1 points. It was “Repressed,” ranking 155th

overall and 27th in the Americas (Table 15. 2).