The Benefits of Being neither Fish nor Fowl: The UK Caribbean Overseas Territories in the International Community

AuthorSir Ronald Sanders
Pages87-97
87
- THE BENEFITS OF BEING NEITHER FISH NOR FOWL -
The Benefits of Being neither
Fish nor Fowl:
The UK Caribbean Overseas Territories in the
International Community
This chapter is concerned with the UK Caribbean Overseas
Territories (COTs) which have achieved varying measures of autonomy
over their domestic affairs while the British government retains control
of their external affairs and defence. These countries are neither fish
nor fowl in the international community. While they are not players
in their own right in global affairs, some of what they do, and what
they experience, does concern large countries in the wider international
community. And, these large countries sometimes act in ways that
constrain local decision-making even as local decision-makers are denied
the right to make representation for themselves.
Two cases in point are: the ‘Harmful Tax Competition Initiative’
(HTCI) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and the criteria for judging non-cooperative
jurisdictions in money laundering devised by the OECD’s sister
organisation, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Between 2000
and 2001, both of these bodies blacklisted a number of the COTs on
the basis of rules which they arbitrarily devised and unilaterally tried
to enforce. The ostensible objective of the HTCI was to guard against
resident persons and companies of OECD member states establishing
bank accounts and international business corporations in non-OECD
countries or jurisdictions to evade taxation.1 Eventually, a global forum
of OECD and non-OECD countries was formed and the HTCI
collapsed on the demand of the non-OECD jurisdictions for a level
playing field with some OECD countries such as Switzerland, which
had opposed it from the outset. Nevertheless, considerable pressure
was placed on the COTs to comply with the HTCI, particularly as a
SIR RONALD S ANDERS
5.

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