Rowena Johnson-Dennie v Transport Inspector
| Jurisdiction | Jamaica |
| Judge | A. Nembhard J |
| Judgment Date | 10 June 2020 |
| Date | 10 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | CLAIM NO. 2009 HCV 06369 |
| Court | Supreme Court (Jamaica) |
[2020] JMSC Civ 112
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF JAMAICA
IN CIVIL DIVISION
CLAIM NO. 2009 HCV 06369
and
and
and
Dr Garth Lyttle instructed by Garth E. Lyttle & Company for the Claimant
Mr Harrington McDermott instructed by Campbell McDermott for the 1 st, 2 nd and 3 rd Defendants
Miss Deidre Pinnock instructed by the Director of State Proceedings for the 4 th Defendant
Tort — Wrongful interference with goods — Detinue — Conversion — The Transport Authority Act, sections, 13, 13A, 15, 16A, The Road Traffic Act, section 61(4A) and 61(4B)
By way of an Amended Claim Form, filed on 19 October 2012, the Claimant, Mrs Rowena Johnson-Dennie, seeks to recover from the Defendants, the following:-
-
(1) Damages in Detinue and Conversion;
-
(2) Damages for loss of use of her public passenger vehicle in the sum of $1,575,000.00, and continuing;
-
(3) Damages for the value of this vehicle in the sum of $1,200,000.00;
-
(4) Wrecker and storage fees in the sum of $12,500.00; and
-
(5) Costs and Attorney's costs.
The Claimant, Mrs Rowena Johnson-Dennie, contends that on 12 August 2009, her Toyota Hiace motor vehicle, registered PA 6513, (“the Toyota Hiace”) was being driven along Spanish Town Road, in the parish of Kingston, by her duly authorized driver, Mr Norman Cunningham, when the 1 st Defendant, Transport Authority Inspector Wayne Emmanuel, unlawfully and without reasonable and probable cause seized and detained the Toyota Hiace for the offence of Operating a Public Passenger Vehicle without a Road Licence. Mr Cunningham produced a photocopy of the Road Licence for the Toyota Hiace but was unable to produce the original.
Later that same day, Mrs Johnson-Dennie attended the office of the 3 rd Defendant, the Transport Authority, located at 119 Maxfield Avenue, Kingston 10 and produced the original Road Licence. Mrs Johnson-Dennie contends that she was advised to pay the applicable wrecker and storage fees, which she did. Thereafter, she was handed a form entitled “Release and Discharge” and was required to sign same. She refused to sign this document and contends that the Transport Authority refused to return the Toyota Hiace to her.
Mrs Johnson-Dennie further contends that she subsequently returned to the office of the Transport Authority, on several occasions, where she made several demands for the release of the Toyota Hiace to her. These requests were refused by the Transport Authority.
Conversely, the 1 st Defendant, Transport Authority Inspector Wayne Emmanuel, the 2 nd Defendant, Miss Diana Patterson and the 3 rd Defendant, the Transport Authority, maintain that, at the time of the seizure of the Toyota Hiace, Mr Cunningham was unable to produce a valid Road Licence. They assert that it is on that basis that the Toyota Hiace was seized.
It is not disputed that Mrs Johnson-Dennie produced the original Road Licence on the same day of the incident. The 1 st, 2 nd and 3 rd Defendants contend that, having done that, the Toyota Hiace was released to her.
The 1 st, 2 nd and 3 rd Defendants contend that the request that Mrs Johnson-Dennie signs the Release and Discharge Form was never a prerequisite for the Toyota Hiace being released to her. They deny that Miss Patterson refused to release the Toyota Hiace to Mrs Johnson-Dennie. They also deny Mrs Johnson-Dennie's assertion that the Transport Authority refused to release the Toyota Hiace to her.
At the close of the case for Mrs Johnson-Dennie, the Claim against the 4 th Defendant, the Attorney General of Jamaica, was dismissed, with costs being awarded to the Attorney General.
The following issues arise for the Court's determination:-
-
(1) Whether the 3 rd Defendant, through its servants, the 1 st and 2 nd Defendants, had reasonable and probable cause to seize the Claimant's motor vehicle;
-
(2) Whether the Claimant has proven trespass to property;
-
(3) Whether the Claimant has proven Detinue; and
-
(4) Whether the Claimant has proven Conversion.
There are three ways in which one might deprive another of his property: (i) by wrongfully taking it; (ii) detaining it; or (iii) disposing of it. In the first, the defendant gains possession by wrongful appropriation, in the second, he might acquire possession rightfully but retains it wrongfully, and, in the third, he neither takes nor retains it wrongfully but so disposes of the chattel that it is lost to the owner, for example, by destruction or sale.
Corresponding to these modes of dispossession, the common law has provided three actions: (i) trespass for the first; detinue for the second; and trover or conversion for the third.
The position in law has changed in England as the tort of detinue has been abolished by statute. Until 1978, two (2) main causes of action lay for the protection of proprietary interests in goods. These were trover (now more commonly called “conversion”) and detinue. The Torts (Interference with Goods) Act, 1977 abolished the former tort of detinue and expanded the scope of conversion, which now lies in every case in which detinue formerly lay, before it was abolished. Today, the law on wrongful interference encompasses the specific torts of conversion, trespass to goods and negligence, so far as it results in damage to goods or to an interest in goods. 1
There does not appear to be any statute in Jamaica akin to the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act, 1977. As such, the common law actions of trespass to goods, detinue and trover or conversion remain available to persons aggrieved.
The action of detinue lay, at the suit of a claimant having a right to immediate possession, for the wrongful detention of his chattel by the defendant, evidenced by the defendant's refusal to deliver it up on demand.
The cause of action of detinue concerns the wrongful interference with the goods of another and “…accrues from the date of wrongful refusal to deliver up the goods of another on demand.” 2
Waddington J.A., in George and Branday, Ltd. v Lee 3 summarized the gist of the cause of action as follows:-
“The gist of the cause of action in detinue is the wrongful detention, and in order to establish that, it is necessary to prove a demand for the return of the property detained and refusal, after a reasonable time, to comply with such demand.”
Detinue is defined as follows:-
“Where a person has possession of goods of another and a valid demand is made for them by the owner, and an unqualified, unjustifiable refusal to deliver them up entitles the owner to sue in detinue…” 4
The elements required to establish the tort of detinue were stated by McDonald J in Carol Campbell v Transport Authority, 5 as follows:-
‘…to establish that the detention has become adverse and in defiance of her rights, the Claimant must prove that – (i) she “unconditionally and specifically” demanded return of the motor vehicle (per George and Branday, Ltd.); and (ii) the Defendant refused to comply after a reasonable time.’
A defendant's refusal to comply with a claimant's request must be categorical or unequivocal; if qualified by a reasonable and legitimate purpose, without expressing or implying an assertion of dominion inconsistent with the claimant's rights, it amounts to neither detinue nor conversion.
The distinction between a cause of action in conversion and a cause of action in detinue is that the former is a single wrongful act and the cause of action accrues at the date of the conversion. The latter is a continuing cause of action which accrues at the date of the wrongful refusal to deliver up the goods and continues until delivery up of the goods or judgment in the action for detinue. 6
In order to maintain an action in conversion or detinue, a person must have the right of possession and a right of property in the goods at the time of the conversion or detinue.
Trover or conversion was originally a form of trespass on the case and derived its name from, and was based on, a fiction that the defendant had come lawfully into possession of the goods of another and converted them to his own use. It is a remedy to recover the value of specific personal chattels which have been wrongfully converted by another to his own use. The act to constitute a conversion “must be an unequivocal act of ownership, i.e., an act such as acquiring, dealing with or disposing of the goods, which is consistent only with the rights of an owner as distinct from the equivocal acts of one who is entrusted with the custody or handling or carriage of the goods. A demand and refusal is not, therefore, itself a conversion…” 7
Originally, conversion was concerned with the defendant's wrongful dealing with the plaintiff's chattel so as to deprive the plaintiff of its value. Wrongful taking was trespass; wrongful detention was detinue; trover (an action on the case, for conversion) emerged to supply and exploit gaps in the existing scheme of remedies.
A conversion is an act or a complex series of acts of which, wilful interference, without lawful justification, with any chattel in a manner inconsistent with the right of another, whereby that other is deprived of the use and possession of it.
The law in relation to conversion has been comprehensively set out by McIntosh JA in The Commissioner of Police and the Attorney General v Vassell Lowe 8. For ease of reference, the relevant portions are set out below:-
“[35] …The learned trial judge had placed reliance on the definition of conversion in the 21 st edition...
To continue reading
Request your trial