Patrick Green v R (No. 2)

• Jurisdiction: Jamaica
• Court: Court of Appeal (Jamaica)
• Judge: McDonald-Bishop, P.
• Judgment Date: 27 March 2026
• Neutral Citation: JM 2026 CA 25
• Year: 2026
• Docket Number: Suit No.: Criminal Appeal 39 of 2015

Patrick Green

and

R (No. 2)

JM 2026 CA 25

Mcdonald-Bishop, P.

Suit No.: Criminal Appeal 39 of 2015

Court of Appeal

Appearances:

George Clue for the appellant.

Ms. Latoya Bernard and David Bowes for the Crown.

McDonald-Bishop, P.

1 This is an appeal by Patrick Green (‘the appellant’), filed with the leave of a single judge of this court, against the sentences imposed by Gayle, J. on 12 March 2015 in the Western Regional Gun Court. The sentences relate to 23 counts of various sexual and other offences contained in three indictments, arising from incidents that occurred on 24 September 2012 (‘the first indictment’), 1 January 2014 (‘the second indictment’), and 18 December 2013 (‘the third indictment’). The allegations underpinning each indictment will be outlined in detail later in this judgment, as necessary, when the court considers whether there is any legal basis to interfere with the sentences imposed on each.

2 The appellant pleaded guilty to all 23 counts. The sentence imposed on each count is conveniently outlined as follows:

The first indictment (24 September 2012 offences)
Count No.	Offence	Sentences imposed
I	Illegal possession of firearm	20 years' imprisonment at hard labour
II	Forcible abduction	15 years' imprisonment at hard labour
III, V, VI, VII and VIII	Rape	35 years' imprisonment at hard labour on each count
IV	Buggery	15 years' imprisonment
IX, X, XI and XII	Grievous sexual assault	15 years' imprisonment on each count
The second indictment (1 January 2014 offences)
Count No.	Offence	Sentences imposed
I	Illegal possession of firearm	15 years' imprisonment
II	Forcible abduction	15 years' imprisonment
III	Rape	35 years' imprisonment
IV	Grievous sexual assault	15 years' imprisonment
V and VI	Robbery with aggravation	15 years' imprisonment on each count
The third indictment (18 December 2013 offences)
Count No.	Offence	Sentences imposed
I	Illegal possession of firearm	5 years' imprisonment at hard labour
II	Forcible abduction	5 years' imprisonment
III	Rape	5 years' imprisonment
IV	Grievous sexual assault	5 years' imprisonment
V	Robbery with aggravation	5 years' imprisonment at hard labour

3 The learned judge ordered the sentences on the first and second indictments to run concurrently, while the sentences on the third indictment were to run consecutively with those imposed on the first and second indictments. As a result, the aggregate term of imprisonment imposed by the learned judge was 40 years.

THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL

4 With the leave of a single judge of this court granted on 15 November 2022, the appeal was brought on two grounds as stated in the Form B1 dated 19 May 2015:

• “(a) Unfair trial:—That the sentences are harsh and manifestly excessive and cannot be justified by this court.

• (b) The learned Trial Judge did not temper Justice with mercy as my guilty plead [sic] was not taken into consideration.”

5 On 13 March 2026, after considering the appeal and the submissions of counsel for the appellant and the Crown, we made the following orders with a promise that the written reasons for our decision would be provided later.

In fulfilment of our promise, these are the reasons for the orders made. The parties' contentions

• “1. The appeal against sentence is allowed, in part.

• 2. Concerning the indictment relating to the offences committed on 24 September 2012, (‘the first indictment’):

  • a. The sentences imposed on count I for the offence of illegal possession of firearm and count II for the offence of forcible abduction, are affirmed.

  • b. The sentences of 35 years' imprisonment at hard labour imposed on counts III, V, VI, VII & VIII for the offence of rape are set side; substituted therefor are the following sentences on each count:

    • (i) On counts III, VII & VIII, sentence of 35 years' imprisonment with the stipulation that the appellants shall serve 32 years before eligibility for parole.

    • (ii) On counts V & VI, a sentence of 35 years' imprisonment with the stipulation that the appellant shall serve 30 years' before eligibility for parole.

  • c. The sentences of 15 years' imprisonment imposed on counts IX, X, XI & XII for the offence of grievous sexual assault are set aside, substituted therefor are the following sentences on each count:

    • (i) On counts IX & X, the sentence of 15 years' imprisonment with the stipulation that the appellant shall serve 11 years' imprisonment before eligibility for parole.

    • (ii) On counts XI & XII, the sentence of 15 years' imprisonment with the stipulation that the appellant shall serve 13 years' imprisonment before eligibility for parole.

  • d. The sentence of 15 years' imprisonment for the offence of buggery is set aside, substituted therefor is a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment at hard labour.

• 3. Concerning the indictment relating to the offences committed on 1 January 2014 (‘the second indictment’):

  • a. The sentences on count I for the offence of illegal possession of firearm, count II for the offence of forcible abduction and counts V & VI for the offence of robbery with aggravation, are affirmed.

  • b. The sentence of 35 years' imprisonment imposed on count III for the offence of rape is set aside, substituted therefor is a sentence of 35 years' imprisonment with the stipulation the appellant shall serve 32 years before eligibility for parole.

  • c. The sentence of 15 years' imprisonment imposed on count IV for the offence of grievous sexual assault is set aside, substituted therefor is a sentence of 15 years' imprisonment with the stipulation that the appellant shall serve 13 years before eligibility for parole.

• 4. The sentences imposed on all counts of the indictment relating to the offences committed on 18 December 2013 (‘the third indictment’) are affirmed.

• 5. The sentences imposed for the offences on the first and second indictments shall run concurrently as ordered by the learned judge and are to be reckoned as having commenced on 12 March 2015, the date on which they were imposed.

• 6. The sentences imposed for the offences on the third indictment shall run consecutively to the sentences imposed on the first and second indictments as ordered by the learned judge.”

6 Counsel for the appellant, Mr. George Clue, focused his challenge on the 35-year sentences imposed for the counts of rape on the first and second indictments, notwithstanding that the grounds of appeal were framed in general terms and were not so limited. In summary, Mr. Clue argued that:

• i) The learned judge did not adhere to the prescribed methodology in sentencing the appellant established in Meisha Clement v. R [2016] J.M.C.A. Crim 26 (‘ Meisha Clement’) and Daniel Roulston v. R [2018] J.M.C.A. Crim 20 (‘ Daniel Roulston’), by failing to properly sentence the appellant on each count of the indictment and merely indicated a sentence of 35 years' imprisonment for all counts of rape.

• ii) The sentences for the counts of rape on the first and second indictments are excessive, having regard to the circumstances of the offences and the appellant's guilty pleas.

• iii) The learned judge did not give the appellant credit for the 11 months he spent in custody prior to being sentenced.

7 In response, counsel for the Crown, Ms. Latoya Bernard, assisted by Mr. David Bowes, contended, in summary:

• i) The learned judge's sentencing remarks do not reflect the sentencing methodology outlined in Meisha Clement and Daniel Roulston. However, though the letter of the law was not followed, the sentences imposed by the learned judge were not manifestly excessive.

• ii) The offences committed by the appellant are among the worst examples of the offences in our jurisdiction. The sentences imposed are appropriately high given the egregious circumstances of the offences.

• iii) The learned judge balanced the appellant's guilty pleas against the appellant's previous convictions, his propensity to reoffend, his known personality disorder and the gruesome nature of the offences.

• iv) From the length of the sentences imposed, it can be inferred that the appellant's sentences were reduced due to his guilty pleas. Any further reduction would be disproportionate to the severity of the crimes and would shock the public conscience, thereby constituting a serious misadministration of justice.

• v) The learned judge failed to give credit for the time the appellant spent in custody prior to being sentenced, thereby deviating from settled law. That failure by the judge should be corrected. However, any credit given should be applied only to the first indictment. No credit should be given on the second or third indictments. There is otherwise no basis to interfere with the sentences imposed on the first and second indictments.

• vi) Regarding the third indictment, the sentences of 5 years' imprisonment for rape and grievous sexual assault are unduly lenient as they are below the statutory mandatory minimum sentences set by the Sexual Offences Act (‘SOA’), and should be adjusted by the court.

THE ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

8 The issues arising from the grounds of appeal and the arguments advanced in support of, and opposition to them were:

• a. Whether the learned judge failed to apply the correct methodology in sentencing the appellant.

• b. Whether the sentences imposed for rape on the first and second indictments are manifestly excessive.

• c. Whether the learned judge erred by failing to give appropriate discounts for the guilty pleas.

• d. Whether the learned judge erred in failing to give credit for the time the appellant spent on pre-sentence remand.

• e. Whether the sentences imposed on the third indictment are wrong in law, unduly lenient and should be disturbed by an upward adjustment.

9 In evaluating these issues, seriatim, we were...