Enhancing Regional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in the Caribbean: CARICOM and the Failure of Mediation in the St. Kitts and Nevis Conflict

• Author: Clifford E. Griffin
• Pages: 72-90

Enhancing Regional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in Caribbean

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Enhancing Regional Conflict Resolution

Mechanisms in the Caribbean: CARICOM and the

Failure of Mediation in the St. Kitts and Nevis Conflict

Introduction

That conflict is central to politics remains a

fundamental assumption of contemporary

international relations. All societies,

communities, organizations, and interpersonal

relationships experience conflict at one time

or another in the process of day-to-day

interaction. Conflict and disputes exist when

people are engaged in competition to meet

goals that are perceived to be, or actually are,

incompatible. (Moore 1996) This truism holds

for relations within, between and among

the15-member regional organization,

CARICOM — especially between St. Kitts and

Nevis, the multi-island country upon which this

chapter focuses — and between members

and non-members as well. Short of going to

war, the use of intermediaries or third party

action via adjudication, arbitration,

conciliation, consultations, good offices,

mediation, or simply fact finding, are among

the modes of dispute settlement, conflict

management and conflict resolution open to

states.

According to some scholars, the

explanation for the use of intermediaries and

the reliance on third party action rests upon

the assumption of a difference between the

natures of domestic and international society.

For while it is generally accepted that conflicts

of interest will inevitably develop between

individuals, organized groups and (eventually)

governments, the convention is to ‘contrast the

C L I F F O R D E. G R I F F I N

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markedly different means of managing or

settling such disputes within the two forms of

society. (Mitchell and Webb 1998, 2)

On the one hand, the argument holds that

domestic conflicts take place within an

environment (a state) reflecting a legitimate

authority structure that monopolizes power

according to a set of rules and institutions for

determining the outcome of any conflict that

arises within its boundaries. For example,

states create electoral systems to settle conflicts

over who will occupy and execute political

authority within the country and the

mechanism by which the occupants of political

authority will be reviewed (and changed)

periodically. This means that when contesting

parties resort to violence to settle a dispute,

be it a riot, a secessionist movement, or a

civil war, the inference drawn is that the society

has in some sense ‘broken down’ or that its

methods for managing conflict have, perhaps

temporarily, proved inadequate. (Mitchell and

Webb 1998) This appears to be the case with

regard to the conflict in St. Kitts and Nevis;

the same argument could be made with regard

to Guyana as well. Nevertheless, apart from

the occasional use of informal and relatively

unstructured mediation or conciliation

episodes, domestic systems are typified by their

formal rules and structures for conflict

management.

On the other hand, some scholars argue

that in today’s ‘anarchical society’ (Bull

1979), while the probability that major conflicts

of interests will develop between international

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states is just as likely as in domestic societies,

there is no centralized, legitimized authority

to establish and operate any formal system

for conflict management; therefore, the

processes by which international disputes are

managed and settled have to be largely

informal and largely dependent upon their

acceptability to those independent and

sovereign entities engaged in the conflict. And

if they are not acceptable, they are not used.

(Mitchell and Webb 1998) But there is

evidence that a number of regional and

international organizations have been

established since 1648 for avoiding or

ameliorating wars emerging from

international conflicts of interest. During the

twentieth century, for example, both the

Council of the League of Nations and the

Security Council and the Secretary General

of the United Nations have a conflict

management function to fulfill.

A similar function exists in regional

organizations such as the Organization of

American States (OAS) through its Secretary

General and the Organization of African Unity

(OAU) through its Committee on Mediation

and Conciliation. In the case of the latter, many

point out that the practical work of this

committee is conducted through a series of

ad hoc missions to various African parties in

conflict. The international system has also

attempted to establish legal processes for

managing conflicts, including the Permanent

Court of Arbitration, the Permanent Court of

International Justice (and its successor, the

International Court of Justice), and more

recently, the International Criminal Court. In

the Caribbean, this is increasingly becoming

the case within CARICOM.

A study of all of these international

organizations demonstrates two things. One,

that the activities of some third party acting as

a channel of communication to overcome

deadlock, to suggest alternative formulae, to

get the parties to re-examine their options and

position, to supply rewards and inducements

for concessions, or to perform a number of

other functions underscores the importance

of mediation and intermediaries in regional

and international conflict management. And

two, given the weakness of other modes of

handling conflicts of interest at the regional

and international system level, there continues

to be a need for skilful mediators and

conciliators in an increasingly interconnected

world.

It is this need for more skilful mediators

and conciliators to enhance the level of

governance within CARICOM that is central

to this analysis. The focus, therefore, is on

conflict management/resolution within this

organization. As will be shown later on,

CARICOM is structured similarly to other

regional organizations such as the OAU and

the OAS, and like them uses mediation to try

to resolve disputes among its members. And

like these organizations, CARICOM faces some

of the same challenges that regional

organizations must confront with respect to

mediating disputes among members. The

probing question that this analysis interrogates,

therefore, is Why has CARICOM been

ineffective in mediating long-term solutions to

some of the latent and ongoing domestic and

regional conflicts that plague its member

states?

I argue that in addition to the difficulties

that it must confront as a regional

organization, CARICOM’S political culture

strongly impacts upon its ability to effectively

mediate disputes and conflicts among

members. I do not argue that mediation is an

ineffective mode of conflict management or

conflict resolution for CARICOM. Instead, my

argument is that mediation has not been

effectively used by this organization. One

fundamental reason being proffered speaks

to the very limited and narrow base of

mediators, who, incidentally, are the heads

of governments themselves — the official

representatives of CARICOM — most of whom

have no formal training in the art of mediation.

Thus, while the Caribbean Court of Justice

(CCJ) is being established to address conflicts