Ebanks v Pocock

• Jurisdiction: Jamaica
• Judge: (Luckhoo, Ag. P., Edun, J.A. and Zacca, Ag. J.A.)
• Judgment Date: 31 July 1975
• Date: 31 July 1975
• Court: Court of Appeal (Jamaica)

Court of Appeal of Jamaica

(Luckhoo, Ag. P., Edun, J.A. and Zacca, Ag. J.A.)

EBANKS

and

POCOCK and ATTORNEY GENERAL

H. Small and O.L. Panton for the appellant;

R.N. Donaldson for the respondents.

Cases cited:

(1) Gould v. Stuart, [1898] A.C. 575, applied.

(2) Rao v. Secretary of State for India, [1937] A.C. 248, considered.

(3) Shenton v. Smith, [1895] A.C. 229, dicta of Lord Hobhouse applied.

Legislation construed:

Police Force Law (Laws of the Cayman Islands, 1963, cap. 126), s.6(1), as amended: The relevant terms of this section are set out at page 209, lines 15.

s.10, as amended: The relevant terms of this sub-section are set out at page 206, lines 622.

s.63(1)(b): The relevant terms of this sub-section are set out at page 206, lines 3032.

Police-conditions of service-dismissal-by Police Force Law (cap. 126), s.10(b)(i), non-gazetted officer sentenced to dismissal first entitled to adjudication of disciplinary charge against him and determination that dismissal appropriate punishment

The appellant brought an action against the respondents in the Grand Court in respect of his wrongful dismissal from the Cayman Islands Police Force.

The appellant, a corporal, was sent a letter of dismissal by the Commissioner of Police after he failed to attend a Guard of Honour without an excuse which the Commissioner was prepared to accept. He sought a declaration from the Grand Court that he had been wrongfully dismissed in breach of the Police Force Law (cap. 126) and was still a member of the Force, or alternatively, damages for wrongful dismissal.

The Grand Court (Horsfall, J.) dismissed the suit on the ground that he had pleaded no law in his statement of claim or referred to any such law in evidence restricting the absolute right of the Crown to dismiss its servants at pleasure.

On appeal, the appellant submitted that although he was a public servant and as such would normally be dismissible at the pleasure of the Crown, the Crowns powers were limited by the Police Force Law (cap. 126), s.10(b)(i) and the Rules made under that Law. In the case of police officers of non-gazetted rank, dismissal was restricted to cases in which the officer had been charged, the matter heard and adjudicated upon and dismissal selected as the appropriate form of punishment in the individual case.

The respondents submitted in reply that on the face of it there was no remedy available to the appellant and that s.10(b) was not a limiting provision but simply one that enabled the Commissioner of Police to exercise the powers of the Crown. Moreover, the Rules made under s.63 relating to offences against discipline were immaterial to the Crowns power to dismiss at pleasure.

Held, allowing the appeal and remitting the case to the Grand Court for the assessment of damages:

Although public servants normally held office during the pleasure of the Crown, this was the case only where no statute provided otherwise. Under the Police Force Law (cap. 126), s.10(b)(i) and the 1961 Rules

made under s.63(1)(b), the power of dismissal of police officers of nongazetted rank was limited to cases where the officer had been charged with a disciplinary offence, the matter adjudicated upon and dismissal selected as appropriate as the sentence imposed and approved by the Administrator. Since none of the required procedures had been followed in the appellants case he had been wrongfully dismissed, the appropriate remedy for which was an award of damages, to include all the emoluments due to him from the date of his dismissal (page 205, lines 3841; page 209, lines 616; page 210, lines 826).

LUCKHOO, Ag. P.: This is an appeal against the decision of
the Judge of the Grand Court, Horsfall, J., dismissing the action of
the appellant Chester Ebanks, The action was one claiming a
declaration that the appellant is still a member of the Cayman
30	Islands Police Force and entitled to all emoluments and privileges
consistent with his being a member of the Cayman Islands Police
Force and payment to him of all emoluments due and arising as
from April 24th, 1972; alternatively, damages for wrongful
dismissal from his employment in the Force.
35	The main questions which arose for determination at the hear-
ing before the learned judge of the Grand Court were whether the
dismissal was in fact wrongful and in breach of the provisions of
the Police Force Law (cap. 126) and if so whether the action
brought by the appellant was maintainable.
40	The facts of the case as found by the learned trial judge may be
summarized as follows. The appellant, a corporal in the Cayman

Islands Police Force, entered the office of Supt. Roy Archer on the
morning of April 24th, 1972 and told him that he had noticed that
he had been put down for the guard of honour but could not make
it because his tunic was too tight. Superintendent Archer refused
5	to accept that excuse and informed the appellant that he would
still be on the guard of honour. At about 2 p.m. that day Supt.
Archer saw a medical certificate in respect of the appellant. That
certificate, purported to have been issued on the same day, stated
that the appellant was suffering from bronchitis and was unfit to
10	carry on his occupation until April 30th. Superintendent Archer
caused Asst. Insp. Soloman to inform the appellant that the
Commissioner of Police was not accepting the medical certificate
and that the appellant was required to return to work and prepare
himself for the guard of honour failing which he was to bring in
15	his stripes. Upon receipt of that message the appellant considered
himself dismissed from the Force. At

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