Clive Martin v Commissioner of Land Valuations
| Jurisdiction | Jamaica |
| Judge | C. Barnaby J |
| Judgment Date | 02 December 2022 |
| Neutral Citation | [2022] JMRC 03 |
| Docket Number | REVENUE COURT APPEAL NO. 2021 RV00004 |
| Court | Supreme Court (Jamaica) |
| Year | 2022 |
JM 2022 SC 184
[2022] JMRC 03
REVENUE COURT APPEAL NO. 2021 RV00004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF JAMAICA
IN THE REVENUE COURT
Land Valuation — Sections 20 and 22 Land Valuation Act — Whether grounds of appeal prescribed by statue exist
Land Valuation Act — Section 2 — Unimproved Value — Whether appropriate comparables used in determining unimproved value of property — Onus of proof
Revenue Appeals Division Act — Section 4 (3) — Power of RAD to consult and obtain assistance
Revenue Appeals Division Rules — Rules 7, 10, and 14 — Power of Revenue Appeal Division — To collect necessary information — Obtain and consider relevant evidence
Michael Powell instructed by Huntley Martin, Attorney-at-Law for the Appellant
Lisa White instructed by the Director of State Proceedings for the Respondent
The Appellant, Clive Martin is the surviving Executor of the Estate of Mavis Martin. In that capacity, Mr. Martin is a registered proprietor of lands in the parish of Hanover registered at Volume 1256 Folio 295 of the Register Book of Titles (hereinafter referred to as “the Ramble Property”, which is agreed by the parties as being comprised of 143.18 hectares or 353.81 acres.
In or around 2017, the Respondent Commissioner — appointed pursuant to section 16 of the Revenue Administration Act (hereinafter called “the RAA”) and having responsibility for land valuations — commissioned a valuation of the Ramble Property in exercise of powers under the Land Valuation Act (hereinafter called “the LVA”). The property was valued on the unimproved basis pursuant to section 2 of the LVA at Seventy-One Million Dollars ($71,000,000.00) as at 1 st July 2013. On the Appellant's objection to the valuation, it was reduced by the Respondent to Forty-Seven Million Dollars ($47,000,000.00).
Still dissatisfied with the reduced valuation, the Appellant appealed to the Revenue Appeals Division (hereinafter called “the RAD”) on 10 th October 2018. In the course of determining the appeal, the RAD instructed Breakenridge & Associates, a firm of valuers who prepared a “ Report & Valuation” and supplemented by letter dated 28 th August 2020 in respect of the Ramble Property (hereinafter called “the Breakenridge Valuation”). The Breakenridge Valuation was prepared following an inspection of the property on 28 th May 2020.
By decision dated 15 th February 2021, which followed a formal hearing, the RAD confirmed the unimproved value of the Ramble Property at Forty-Seven Million Dollars ($47,000,000.00) as at 1 st July 2013. It is from that decision that the Appellant now appeals to this court on the grounds reproduced below.
-
a. The Respondent agreed at the Hearing on July 17, 2019 with the Appellant's contention that the value of 99.62 acres of the Ramble Property was mountainous, non-arable land, unsuitable for agriculture and had a value of $99,000.00. The Revenue Appeals Division fell in error in discarding this acknowledgement of fact by the Respondent — which would have reduced the value of the property to $33,827,471.00, and the per acre value to $95,780 per acre, without taking any other matters into consideration;
-
b. The Revenue Appeals Division erred in substituting a valuation done in 2020 by Breakenridge & Associates for the Valuation done by the Commissioner of Land Valuation in 2013. The Appellant contends the valuation done by the Commissioner of Valuations should be left to stand or fall on its own merit and not be substituted by another Valuation — done in 2020;
-
c. The Revenue Appeals Division erred in excluding the evidence of the only sale comparable put forward by the Appellant, of a Highgate property on the basis that the sale of same in 2019 was too far from the 2013 valuation date to be considered; and
-
d. The Revenue Appeals Division erred in disregarding and failing to take into account cogent evidence that the Commission of Valuations himself, had valued the said Highgate property at the material time in 2013 at $42,328 per acre.
On the 22 nd September 2022, being the date of the hearing of this appeal, judgment was reserved to today's date.
On consideration of the issues set out subsequently, I find that the appeal is to be determined in favour of the Respondent with the costs thereof to be taxed if not sooner agreed.
The following issues arise for determination on the appeal.
-
i. Whether the grounds of Appeal stated by the Appellant are grounds which are permitted to be appealed pursuant to section 20 of the LVA.
-
ii. Whether the RAD erred in excluding the Highgate comparable put forward by the Appellant in assessing the value of the Ramble Property as at 1 st July 2013.
-
iii. Whether the use made by the RAD of the Breakenridge Valuation is permitted by its enabling legislation.
It was contended in limine by Counsel Ms. White for the Respondent that where there is an objection to a valuation it must be on the basis of grounds prescribed at section 20 of the LVA; and that the grounds of appeal to this court must also be those raised at the objection stage, unless an application is made to argue further grounds on appeal pursuant to section 22 of the said Act. Reference was also made to rule 4 of the Revenue Appeals Division Rules which requires appeals to that tribunal to be made in writing and include, among other things, the grounds of appeal. She contended further that none of the section 20 grounds of appeal were identified by the Appellant throughout the objection and appeal stages which should cause the instant appeal to come to an end.
Section 20 of the LVA provides that:
20. Any person who is dissatisfied with a valuation made under this Act may, within sixty days after service of the notice of valuation, post or lodge with the Commissioner an objection in writing against the valuation stating the grounds upon which he relies: such objection shall be in the prescribed form and shall be limited to one or more of the following grounds—
(a) that the values assessed are too high or too low;
(b) that lands which should be included in one valuation have been valued separately;
(c) that lands which should be valued separately have been included in one valuation;
(d) that the person named in the notice is not the owner of the land.
To the extent relevant, section 22 states:
-
(1) Any person who is dissatisfied with the decision of the Commissioner upon an objection may, within sixty days of the service of notice of that decision, or such longer period as may be permitted by or pursuant to rules of court, appeal to the Revenue Court…
-
(2) An appeal shall be limited to the grounds stated in the objection: Provided that the Revenue Court may in its discretion permit the ground of appeal to be amended…
While the submissions of Ms. White as to the applicable law were unassailable, so too the observations of counsel that none of the grounds of challenge as stated in section 20 of the LVA are expressly stated on the Appellant's papers either at the objection or appellate stages, I am unable to agree that the appeal should be dismissed on the basis. It is apparent on the face of the record before the court that the Appellant challenged the valuation on the basis that it was too high, which was in fact recognized by the Respondent at paragraph 2 (b) of the Statement of Case and Amended Statement of Case filed in these proceedings on the 30 th September and 17 th November 2021 respectively. Further, the Respondent had not asserted at any of the case management events ahead of the hearing of the appeal that the Appellant should not be permitted to pursue the grounds of appeal contained in the Notice of Appeal filed in the proceedings. I, therefore, determined that the appeal should not be dismissed on the preliminary point and that it should proceed to a determination on its merits. It is to that enquiry that I now turn.
It is submitted by the Appellant that the Revenue Appeals Division erred in excluding the evidence of the only comparable put forward by him, land part of Highgate, Darliston, Westmoreland identified under Valuation Roll No. 07802015001 (hereinafter called “the Highgate Property”). The property was excluded by the RAD on the basis that the 2019 date of valuation was too far from 1 st July 2013, the valuation date for the Ramble Property, to be a suitable comparable. The submission is without merit.
The Ramble Property was valued pursuant to section 2 of the LVA. In Valuations Commissioner v Hall (1963) 5 W.I.R. 401, 404 on which both parties rely, Lewis JA said this of the provisions.
There is no dispute that these provisions require the Commissioner in valuing the land to visualise a hypothetical sale of the land as one parcel by a willing seller to a willing buyer. The implications of the willing seller and willing buyer concept are now well established and have, with modifications, been codified in the land Acquisitions Statutes of many Commonwealth countries.
It is equally well established, that in arriving at a value of land on the basis of a hypothetical sale by a willing seller to a willing buyer, the comparable sales method may and is often utilised. It was aptly and succinctly stated by Rowe P in Keith C. Burke v Commissioner of Valuations (1987) 24 J.L.R. 368, 372 that in establishing whether or not a neighbouring property is a comparable,
… the onus is upon the party submitting such...
To continue reading
Request your trial