Claudette Crooks-Collie v Charlton Collie
| Jurisdiction | Jamaica |
| Judge | Edwards JA,Brooks JA |
| Judgment Date | 04 March 2022 |
| Neutral Citation | JM 2022 CA 26 |
| Docket Number | SUPREME COURT CIVIL APPEAL NO 28/2016 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Jamaica) |
| Year | 2022 |
[2021] JMCA Civ 7
THE HON Mr Justice Brooks JA
THE HON Miss Justice Edwards JA
THE HON Mrs Justice Foster-Pusey JA
SUPREME COURT CIVIL APPEAL NO 28/2016
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
Mrs Denise Kitson QC and Ms Anna Kaye Brown instructed by Grant, Stewart, Phillips & Co for the appellant
Mrs Sashawah Newby for the respondent
I have had the privilege of reading, in draft, the judgment that my learned sister, Edwards JA, will set out below. Whereas I agree with her reasoning in respect of the issues of law raised by this unusual appeal, and agree with her conclusion that the appeal should be allowed and the counter-notice of appeal should be dismissed, I have a different view from her in respect of the assessment of the evidence by which the learned judge below came to his decision. Accordingly, I will briefly set out my own reasons in the areas in which I hold a different view from my learned sister.
My learned sister's judgment fully sets out the background that has led to this appeal. It is, therefore, only necessary to set out the essence of that background.
The appellant, Mrs Claudette Crooks-Collie (nee Crooks), and the respondent, Dr Charlton Collie, had a relationship lasting many years before they were eventually married. For most of that time, Dr Collie was married to someone else. He was divorced just a few months before he and Mrs Crooks-Collie tied the knot in March 2012. The union quickly unravelled, however, and by August of 2013, they were sleeping in separate bedrooms. In November of that year, a judge of the Parish Court for the parish of Saint Andrew, after allegations against Dr Collie of physical abuse, ordered him to leave the house, which is the subject of this litigation.
That house, located at Plymouth Avenue (‘the Plymouth property’) in the parish of Saint Andrew, was acquired by Mrs Crooks-Collie almost nine years before the parties married. She purchased the Plymouth property and carried out needed major refurbishing, without any input from Dr Collie, who was living outside of the island at the time. Between the purchase price and the refurbishing cost, Mrs Crooks-Collie had spent over $30,000,000.00 on the Plymouth property, by, or about the time, she occupied it.
Dr Collie was still married to someone else when, upon agreement with Mrs Crooks-Collie, he moved into the Plymouth property in 2008 to live with her and their daughter. By the time they got married, he had paid to carry out some improvement work on the Plymouth property. He estimated that, by the time of the wedding, he had spent approximately $1,300,000.00 on various cosmetic, but permanent, improvements to the Plymouth property. In 2010, the Plymouth property was valued in the region of $85,000,000.00.
Before he had even left the Plymouth property, Dr Collie filed a claim in the Supreme Court for a declaration that it was the family home and that he owned a one-half interest in it, pursuant to section 6 of the Property (Rights of Spouses) Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘PROSA’). That section creates a presumption that the spouses are each entitled to a one-half share of the family home, as long as it is wholly owned by one or both of them. Mrs Crooks-Collie resisted the claim on the bases that:
The latter two bases have their foundation in section 7 of the PROSA, which allows a court to set aside the presumption, created by section 6, if the court is of the view that it would be unreasonable or unjust for each spouse to be entitled to a one-half interest in the family home.
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a. The Plymouth property was not the family home because some vacant land elsewhere (‘Cherry Hill’) was intended to have been used to house the family home;
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b. Dr Collie was not entitled to any interest in the Plymouth property because she owned it before the marriage; and
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c. the marriage was one of short duration.
A judge of the Supreme Court heard Dr Collie's claim and ruled that the Plymouth property was the family home and that Dr Collie was entitled to 20% of the value of the property. The learned judge also made other consequential orders, including an order for costs in Dr Collie's favour.
Mrs Crooks-Collie has appealed that decision. She has asserted that the learned judge erred in a number of ways. It is unnecessary for me to set out the numerous grounds of appeal which she has filed, as Edwards JA has set them out in full, and I am happy to adopt the consolidation of the issues emanating therefrom, which Edwards JA has formulated. These are:
“1) whether the learned judge incorrectly identified the issues for his determination (ground a);
2) whether the learned judge misinterpreted sections 6 and 7 of PROSA (grounds b, c and d);
3) whether the learned judge erred in his assessment of the section 7 factors and as a result failed to take them into account as required by section 7 (1)(c) (grounds f and h);
4) whether the learned judge erred in considering the parties' common intention to be relevant in a case brought under PROSA (ground k);
5) whether the learned judge erred in considering the pre-marriage period of the parties' relationship as relevant to his assessment of the intentions of the parties in light of the definition of ‘spouse’ in section 2 of PROSA, and as a result made erroneous findings of law and fact (grounds i, j, l, r, and m);
6) whether the learned judge erred in his treatment and rejection of the unexecuted draft deed of arrangement and the evidence of Reverend Bosworth Mullings, and failed to recognize the significance of that evidence (grounds n, o, and q);
7) whether the learned judge erred in his treatment of the evidence of the parties' relationship and the respondent's contributions to the household and the family home, and as a result, erred in apportioning a 20% interest in the Plymouth property to the respondent, as it was unjust and unreasonable to do so (grounds c, e, g and p);
8) whether the learned judge erred in ordering costs in full to the respondent in circumstances where the appellant was successful in her application for the equal share rule to be varied (ground s);
9) whether the learned judge erred in failing to order that both parties pay the costs of the valuation of the Plymouth property in the ratio of the entitlement he had ordered, in circumstances where the appellant was successful in her application for the equal share rule to be varied (ground t).”
In addition to those issues, Edwards JA considered the counter-notice of appeal that Dr Collie filed. By that counter-notice, he claimed that he was entitled to 20% of the value of the Plymouth property by virtue of the principle of proprietary estoppel.
I broadly agree with my learned sister, for the reasons that she has given, that the grounds of appeal comprised under issues 1–5, set out above, should be dismissed as being without merit. I do have a different view on the analysis, but not the conclusion, on the issue of the common intention, as discussed in issue 4. Regrettably, I am not in agreement in respect of issue 5, which also deals with the issue of common intention. That difference flows from my understanding of the learned judge's approach to the case.
It is my understanding that the learned judge, after setting out the contending cases advanced by the respective parties, made three significant findings:
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a. he determined that the Plymouth property was the family home by applying the definition of “family home” as contained in the PROSA;
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b. he determined that the Plymouth property was the family home based on his analysis of the competing cases and having rejected Mrs Crooks-Collie's case that Cherry Hill was to have been the family home; and
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c. he decided the appropriate division of the beneficial ownership, having considered the contributions that he accepted that Dr Collie had made to the family and the Plymouth property.
Although the learned judge used a heading of “PRESUMPTION OF EQUAL SHARES: TO VARY OR NOT TO VARY”, his discussion of common intention under that heading, in my view, was in the context of which property was intended to have been the family home, and not, as Mrs Crooks-Collie has advanced in this appeal, concerned with the intention as to beneficial ownership. Although the learned judge started the discussion under that heading with a consideration of the issue of contribution, he quickly turned, at paragraph [55], to addressing the search for a family home. At paragraph [56], he continued the theme of a search for a family home and asserted that “from at least 2008 [Dr Collie and Mrs Crooks-Collie] were displaying their intentions to treat Plymouth as their home”. He continued that theme at paragraph [57] saying that although the pre-marriage period was not relevant for determining the length of time that the Plymouth property could be considered the family home for the purposes of PROSA, it was “relevant in determining the intention of the parties as to how Plymouth was to be viewed once they were married”. He made a more definitive statement along those lines at paragraph [58]. He said, in part:
“…If one were to look at the actions of the parties, one would say that Dr. Collie's actions leading up to the time of their marriage is [sic] consistent with his assertion that the mutual intention at the time of their marriage was that Plymouth would become the family home after the wedding.”
Immediately after making that statement, the learned judge outlined Mrs Crooks-Collie's contending case. He said, in part, at paragraph [59]:
“Juxtapose this against the contrary intention asserted by Mrs. Crooks Collie; that Plymouth was never to be the matrimonial or family home and that among the purposes of the Deed of Arrangements...
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