Case For Electoral Reform?

• Author: Kirk Meighoo/Peter Jamadar
• Profession: Member of the Democratic National Assembly and the author of Politics in a Half-Made Society: Trinidad and Tobago 1925?2002/Judge of the Supreme Court of Trinidad and Tobago and the author of The Mechanics of Democracy
• Pages: 122-173

122| Democracy and Constitution Reform

A Case for

Electoral Reform?

5

So far, theoretically and philosophically, it has been argued that the

fundamental institution in a political system that aspires to the democratic

ideal is not the executive (prime minister and cabinet), whether directly

elected or indirectly elected. One cannot judge the state of democracy

simply by determining whether or how the government is elected.

Conceivably, a nation can be given a choice of persons to elect, give

them licence to behave autocratically and dictatorially without respect,

responsibility, or accountability, and then have the opportunity to throw

them out every five years. This cannot be democratic in its fuller,

republican sense. The fundamental institution in democratic

arrangements, we have argued, is the parliament, or national legislature.

The national legislature, on the one hand, is an assembly of a country’s

representatives who publicly discuss and debate laws and other national

issues, on behalf of the citizens to whom they are responsible. On the

other hand, in between elections, the legislature in a true democracy

has the authority and strength to make the executive effectively

responsible to it. It is the extent to which a national assembly succeeds

or fails in these tasks in practice (as opposed to what exists on paper)

that provides us with a sounder measure of the state of democracy in a

given country, no matter what its particular institutional or constitutional

arrangements.

It has been argued that while the West Indian score in this regard is

not the worst among states which consider themselves democratic, a

great deal needs to be improved. What seems needed overall is a more

powerful legislature, more effective representation, higher quality formal

and informal public discussion, debate, and conciliation, and a

responsible prime minister and cabinet. Historically, we have seen how

A Case for Electoral Reform? |123

our system of government and politics has remained under unresponsible

executive supremacy, against the principles of liberal, republican,

representative democracy, despite the promising reforms of 1946 to

1956 which sought to swing the balance toward the legislature. The

unhealthy focus on capturing control of an unresponsible executive

distorts and thwarts our political development. This is tied to our

reflections on the nature of our habits, traditions, expectations, national

character, and other more human (rather than institutional) traits that

both help and hinder the development of an effective, authentic West

Indian democracy.

For instance, even during the 18–18 Parliamentary draw in 2001,

the parties could not reach a working compromise. They demanded a

winner despite the tie, and they could not even agree on a Speaker. Our

Parliament has failed to be a conciliatory institution, an institution in

which the public good can be discerned by open, secure discussion

between diverse and heterogeneous interests. Our Parliament, dominated

by unqualified party loyalties, seems to artificially generate conditions

for unnecessary conflict. Yet, unlike other societies which truly have

ethnic or other deep-seated rivalries and hatreds, the society did not

tear itself apart in the absence of a working parliament and the

controversy surrounding control of government. The failure of the

Parliament (but not the society) in that crucial moment, was the

culmination of crises beginning in mid-1999 which had compelled the

country to face a series of serious constitutional questions. These

included:

·the refusal of the President to act upon the prime minister’s advice

for the removal of Tobago Senators;

·the conflict between the Attorney General and the Chief Justice

over the relationship between the Executive, Parliament, and the

Judiciary;

·the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry into the

Administration of Justice, and differing interpretations by the

President and prime minister;

·the eligibility of dual citizens in Parliament; the prime minister’s

124| Democracy and Constitution Reform

power to appoint losing electoral candidates as Senators and the

President’s open rejection of prime ministerial advice;

·the President’s discretion in appointing a prime minister in the

circumstances of electoral controversy; the performance and

potential manipulation of the Elections and Boundaries

Commission;

·the appointment of a prime minister and dissolution of Parliament

when Parliamentary loyalties have changed;

·the appointment of a prime minister in the context of an electoral

tie; the appointment of a Speaker during a Parliamentary deadlock;

·the legitimacy of governmental authority without the proper

convening of Parliament; and

·the sometimes conflicting duties of an MP to his constituents,

conscience, party, and government.

Yet, we failed to effectively address any of these fundamental

questions, leaving our flawed system of government intact, even at the

point where attempt at resolution of these issues seemed most important.

In addition to these challenges, we have seen statistically how the

operation of our FPTP electoral system has resulted in sometimes serious

instances of national disproportionality, rule of organised minorities,

political exclusion (in practice disadvantaging the ethnically centrist

parties with widespread support and exaggerating the strength of the

ethnically extreme parties with enclave support), and wasted votes. So

not only is our parliament dysfunctional, its method of composition

has serious objective weaknesses. A reformed electoral system may play

an important part in larger and wider parliamentary reform.

Despite this seemingly powerful case for parliamentary and electoral

reform, a word of caution is in order. We must not forget the axiom: the

road to hell is paved with good intentions; that well-meaning change

can sometimes result in unforeseen and disastrous consequences. As

thorough as we may try to be, there may be more than a few hidden

advantageous properties of the current system of which we may not be

aware. Conversely, any new system may throw up problems that we