Carty (Leonard) v Merline Carty
| Jurisdiction | Jamaica |
| Judge | PANTON, J.A. , COOKE, J.A. , HARRISON. J.A. , PANTON: J.A. |
| Judgment Date | 11 March 2005 |
| Neutral Citation | JM 2005 CA 11 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [2005] 3 JJC 1103 |
| Date | 11 March 2005 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Jamaica) |
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
REAL PROPERTY - Beneficial interest
RESIDENT MAGISTRATES - Jurisdiction to grant declaration
1. I have read in draft the reasons for judgment written by my learned brother Cooke, J.A., and I agree fully that this appeal should be dismissed. The reasoning of the learned Resident Magistrate is sound. However, I wish to add a few words in respect of the jurisdiction of a Resident Magistrate to grant a declaration.
2. Ground la of the grounds of appeal reads thus:
"Judgment irregular being contrary to law, for example,
a. Over the objections supported by authority, the judge wrongfully allowed the defence and counter claim to stand and also over objection the court proceeded to make declarations without jurisdiction, and so in all respects, misdirected herself".
3. In his written skeleton argument, Mr. Crosbie, on behalf of the appellant, stated that neither the Married Women's Property Act nor the Judicature (Resident Magistrates) Act provides for the making of a declaration in relation to actions under the Married Women's Property Act. Special provision, he said, would have to be made to give a Resident Magistrate such jurisdiction. He referred to the fact that section 106 of the Judicature (Resident Magistrates) Act gives jurisdiction to a Resident Magistrate to make a declaration in matters falling under section 105 of the Act, which latter section does not provide for suits such as the one before the Court. In his oral submissions before us, however, Mr. Crosbie went further by saying that the Resident Magistrate's Court had no jurisdiction whatsoever to grant a declaration as there is no statutory provision that has given this power, and the Resident Magistrate's Court is a creature of statute.
4. Mr. Williams responded by referring to section 199 (e) and (f) of the Judicature (Resident Magistrates) Act which reads as follows:
"199. In order to further the concurrent administration of law and equity in civil causes and matters in the Courts, the following provisions shall apply -
(a) ...
(b) ...
(c) ...
(d) ...
(e) Every Magistrate, in the exercise and within the limits of the jurisdiction vested in his Court by this Act, in every cause or matter pending before him, shall grant, either absolutely, or on such reasonable terms and conditions as to him seem just, all such remedies as any of the parties thereto appear to be entitled to in respect of any legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by them respectively in such cause or matter, so that, as far as possible, all matters so in controversy between the said parties respectively, may be completely and finally determined and multiplicity of proceedings avoided.
(f) Every Magistrate shall, as regards all causes of action within his jurisdiction for the time being, have power to grant, and shall grant in any proceeding in a Court, such relief, redress, or remedy, or combination of remedies, either absolute or conditional, and shall in every such proceeding give such and the like effect to every ground of defence or counter-claim, equitable or legal (subject to the provision next hereinafter contained), in as full and ample a manner as might and ought to be done in the like case by the Supreme Court".
5. In making the submission referred to earlier, Mr. Crosbie, although he did not say it, may have been influenced by the case Phillips v Bisnott (1965) 9 J.L.R. 116. In that case, the Resident Magistrate for the parish of Portland had before him a claim and counterclaim for damages for trespass. The defendant had also counterclaimed for a declaration that she was the sole, absolute and lawful owner of the land which was the subject of the alleged trespass. The Resident Magistrate refused to grant the declaration on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to do so. The appeal filed by the defendant challenged, among other things, this ruling as to lack of jurisdiction. However, during the hearing of the arguments, counsel for the appellant conceded that the Resident Magistrate had no jurisdiction to grant such a declaration (see page 117 A-B). This case should be contrasted with White v Chance (1967) 10 J.L.R. 111, an appeal from the judgment of His Honour Mr. Astwood, Resident Magistrate for Clarendon (as he then was). The respondent's claim was for a declaration that she was entitled to an estate in fee simple in possession of a small parcel of land in Manchester, and for an injunction to restrain the appellant from directing the Registrar of Titles to issue a registered title to the said land in the name of any person other than the respondent. The Resident Magistrate granted the declaration, as prayed. The appeal was against the Resident Magistrate's refusal to allow the appellant's evidence to be taken on commission on the basis of ill health. The majority decision of the Court of Appeal (Duffus, P. and Eccleston, J.A.; Waddington, J.A. dissenting) was that the Resident Magistrate had erred in refusing the application as it was in the interest of justice for the appellant to have been heard. A new trial was ordered.
6. The first point to be made in respect of these cases is that whereas in Phillips v Bisnott learned Queen's Counsel had conceded that there was no jurisdiction for a Resident Magistrate to grant a declaration, the hearing of the appeal in White v Chance proceeded on the basis that the Resident Magistrate did indeed have such jurisdiction. Had it not been so, a new trial would not have been ordered. The second point to be made is that neither case can be said to have definitively determined the question of the jurisdiction as there were no arguments on the matter. That being the position, it is now necessary to examine the provisions of section 199 of the Judicature (Resident Magistrates) Act on which Mr. Williams relies.
7. Section 199(e) gives the Magistrate the power:
"in the exercise and within the limits of the jurisdiction vested in his Court by this Act, in every cause or matter pending before him" to "grant... all such remedies as any of the parties thereto appear to be entitled to in respect of any legal or equitable claim...".
The "jurisdiction" that is vested in the Court and which is here being referred to is the jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes in civil matters. It is set out under various headings between sections 71 and 134 of the Act. It should be noted that paragraph (e) states clearly Parliament's intention that:
"as far as possible, all matters ... in controversy between the ...parties ... be completely and finally determined and multiplicity of proceedings avoided".
As far as section 199 (f) goes, the Magistrate has the authority and power in respect of:
"all causes of action within his jurisdiction" to "grant... relief, redress, or remedy, or combination of remedies, either absolute or conditional".
He is also required to give:
"such and the like effect to every ground of defence or counter-claim, equitable or legal...in as full and ample a manner as might and ought to be done in the like case by the Supreme Court".
Finally, it should also be noted that the governing clause of section 199 states
that the provisions in the various paragraphs (a to g) apply "in order to further
the concurrent administration of law and equity in civil causes and matters in the
Courts".
8. A declaration is generally regarded as the decision of a court as to the state of the law or the rights of a party in a matter. Given that definition, and considering the provisions of section 199 referred to above, there is no justification in strict law or common sense for the holding of the view that a Resident Magistrate has no jurisdiction to grant a declaration. The Resident Magistrate's Court is expected, indeed required, to do substantial justice between the parties in matters that properly come before it. Were it otherwise, there would be an untenable situation considering the very wide jurisdiction of the Court and the vast numbers of persons affected by its decisions. In the instant case, although the learned Resident Magistrate steered clear of the word 'declaration', the fact is that she has declared the rights of the parties on the facts that she found. A trek to the Supreme Court for such a declaration would have been unnecessary.
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Her Honour, Mrs. Marva McDonald-Bishop a resident magistrate for the parish of Manchester delivered on the 15 th April, 2003. Her adjudication was within the context of the Married Woman's Property Act and in particular section 16 thereof. As a ground of appeal challenges her conclusion for want of jurisdiction section 16 is now set out in extenso:
"16. In any question between husband and wife as to the title to or possession of property, either party, or any such bank, corporation, company, public body, or society, as aforesaid in whose books any stocks, funds or shares of either party are standing, may apply by summons or otherwise in a summary way to a Judge of the Supreme Court or (at the option of the applicant irrespectively of the value of the property in dispute) to the Resident Magistrate of the parish in which either party resides; and the Judge of the Supreme Court or the Resident Magistrate, as the case may be, may make such order with respect to the property in dispute, and as to the costs of and consequent on the application, as he thinks fit, or may direct such application to stand over from time to time, and any inquiry...
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