Attorney General of Jamaica v Clayon Tyndale
| Jurisdiction | Jamaica |
| Judge | P Williams JA,Edwards JA,Phillips JA |
| Judgment Date | 20 November 2020 |
| Neutral Citation | JM 2020 CA 143 |
| Date | 20 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | SUPREME COURT CIVIL APPEAL NO 40/2017 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Jamaica) |
[2020] JMCA Civ 60
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
THE HON Miss Justice Phillips JA
THE HON Miss P Williams JA
THE HON Miss Justice Edwards JA
SUPREME COURT CIVIL APPEAL NO 40/2017
Miss Christine McNeil instructed by the Director of State Proceedings for the appellant
Mr Andrew Irving for the respondent
I have read in draft the judgment of my sister Edwards JA. I agree with her reasoning and conclusion and have nothing further to add.
I too have read the draft judgment of my sister Edwards JA and agree with her reasoning and conclusion.
This is an appeal brought by The Attorney-General of Jamaica (“first appellant”) against the decision of Jackson-Haisley J (“the judge”) to include in her calculations for the award of compensation to Clayton Tyndale (“the respondent”) for false imprisonment, a period of five days in detention after the respondent was taken before the court and offered bail.
The circumstances leading to the respondent's claim against the appellant in the court below are relatively unusual, and the appeal against the judge's decision, itself, raises a rather narrow but important point.
The respondent, who is a bus driver, was charged for the offence of rape and was on bail. His girlfriend was the surety for his release on bail. She subsequently made a report to the police that she wished to be released from her recognizance, as the respondent was not adhering to the conditions of his bail, namely, to report to the Duhaney Park Police Station and to attend court.
As a result of her report, Corporal Clarke (the second appellant”) took the respondent into custody on 23 September 2014 at the Pechon Street Bus Park. It was alleged that the arrest of the respondent took place in the presence of approximately 15 passengers who were on the bus he was driving at the time and other members of the public who were in the bus park. The bus was unloaded and the respondent was instructed to drive to the Darling Street Police Station. He alleged that he felt embarrassed, distressed and humiliated by this. At the police station he saw his girlfriend and, in his presence and hearing, she repeated her allegations that he had not been attending court or reporting to the Duhaney Park Police Station as required by the condition of his bail. The respondent denied these allegations and told the police that her report was false and resulted from a disagreement between them. He complained that the second appellant did not investigate the allegations made against him to determine if they were true.
The respondent was placed in the lock-ups at the Darling Street Police Station and was later transferred to the Hunts Bay Police Station lock-up. He was not taken before the court until 23 October 2014, where his girlfriend was released as his surety and he was re-offered bail with a requirement for a new surety and new bonds. He was bailed with surety five days later on 28 October 2014.
The respondent subsequently filed a claim in the Supreme Court of Jamaica against the appellants seeking damages for false imprisonment, aggravated and/or exemplary damages, interest and costs. In his claim, he averred that he was, maliciously and without reasonable cause, falsely imprisoned and deprived of his liberty from 23 September 2014 to 28 October 2014. He relied on the provisions in section 19 of the Bail Act which sets out the procedure to be followed when a surety wishes to be released from recognizance. He averred that the provisions of the section were not adhered to and as a result his arrest and detention was unlawful.
The appellants filed a defence to the claim limited to quantum, thus conceding that the arrest of the respondent by the second appellant was unlawful. A judgment on admission was subsequently entered in favour of the respondent and a date was set for an assessment of damages hearing to be held. The assessment of damages was heard by the judge, at the end of which she made the following orders:
“I. General Damages awarded to the claimant in the sum of $4,235,000.00 with interest at a rate of 3% per annum from 16 th December, 2014 to 24 th March 2017;
II. Special Damages awarded to the Claimant in the sum of $80,000.00 with interest at a rate of 3% per annum from 23 rd September, 2014 to 24 March 2017;
III. No award is made for Aggravated Damages or for Exemplary Damages; and
IV. Cost to the claimant to be agreed or taxed.”
This appeal relates to the calculation of the number of days in detention forming the basis of the award made in paragraph I of her orders. The respondent filed a counter-notice of appeal challenging the value of the award for general damages as being inordinately low.
There is no complaint that the judge did not apply the proper principles in the assessment of damages. In her analysis of the evidence and the submissions made to her, the judge correctly noted that “[t]he purpose of the assessment of damages is to arrive at a figure that will provide adequate compensation to the Claimant for the damage, loss or injury suffered”. She cited a passage from Lord Blackburn's dictum in Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25 as supporting this view.
In making the assessment she relied on principles set out in the cases including Maxwell Russell v The Attorney General of Jamaica and anor (unreported), Supreme Court, Jamaica, Suit No CL No 2006 HCV 4024, judgment delivered on 18 January 2008, and went on to state that:
“Mangatal J in Maxwell Russell case went on to highlight the dicta of Lord Woolf M.R. in Thompson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 1998 QB 498, where he pointed out that damages for false imprisonment, i.e. for loss of liberty, and damages for malicious prosecution, are compensation for something which is akin to pain and suffering. Mangatal J used the formula recommended by Lord Woolf MR and awarded damages for the first 24 hours and thereafter at a progressively reducing scale.”
The judge then stated that she would not make an award for the initial shock because the claimant had already spent time in custody in relation to the rape charge. In respect to the number of days for which compensation should be awarded she relied on the decision of F Williams J (as he then was) in Conrad Gregory Thompson v Attorney General of Jamaica (unreported), Supreme Court, Jamaica, Claim No 2008 HCV 02530, judgment delivered on 31 May 2011, and concluded that the five days that it took the respondent to take up his bail should be included in the calculation of the awards. The judge cited the following passage from the judgment of F Williams J regarding the consequences of the claimant's inability to take up his bail:
“In the court's view the false imprisonment and the malicious prosecution in this regard are inextricably intertwined. If he has [sic] not been detained and then prosecuted on a false charge, he would likely have continued to enjoy his liberty. The defendant must be held responsible for all the consequences of that detention, malicious prosecution and the resultant false imprisonment. In the court's view the claimant must be compensated for all the days he remained in custody.”
Jackson-Haisley J then went on to hold that:
“In the circumstances, I find that but for the False Imprisonment that took place on September 23, 2014 this Claimant would not have been in custody for that period of time and so I am prepared to make an award for the 35 days.”
In calculating the general damages, the learned judge held inter alia that:
“I find that [an] award of $121,000.00 per day to be appropriate. The award should be the same for each day incarcerated. This amounts to $4,235,000.00 representing General Damages for False Imprisonment.”
The appellants filed notice and grounds of appeal in this court on 5 May 2017.
The grounds of appeal filed were as follows:
“i. The Learned Judge erred in law by failing to appreciate that the claimant could only recover damages for the period of his imprisonment prior to the date and time he was remanded arising from his inability to meet his bail, per Lock v [Ashton] [1848] 12 QB 871 and Diamond v Minter (1941) 1 KB 656 among others.
ii. The learned judge erred in law when she relied on the dicta of F Williams, J (Ag.) in Claim No. 2008 HCV 02530 – Conrad Gregory Thompson v Attorney General for Jamaica delivered May 31, 2011.
iii. Consequently, the sum awarded for False Imprisonment, to include the time when he was remanded by the court, is excessive and ought to be reduced.”
The appellants sought the following orders based on the grounds of appeal filed:
“(i) That the appeal be allowed and the orders of the Honourable Mrs Justice Jackson-Haisley (Ag.) delivered on March 24, 2017 be set aside; and
(ii) That the award for False Imprisonment be set aside and reduced to accurately reflect the proper time frame of the Claimant's imprisonment.”
Counsel Miss Christine McNeil argued on behalf of the appellants that the grounds of appeal are rooted in a single issue, that is:
“Whether the respondent who was initially falsely imprisoned, was entitled to damages for false imprisonment, as found by the learned trial judge, for the further period he remained in detention after the court made an order granting him bail, with surety.”
Counsel contended that the applicable principle is that where a person is arrested and taken into custody and that person is subsequently taken before the court and is remanded in custody by an order of the court, that continued detention and imprisonment is made lawful by the fact that it was...
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